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I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COUNTY'S REPLACEMENT BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH 
THE COURT'S SUPPLEMENT AL BRIEFING ORDER AND SHOULD BE 
STRICKEN. 
The Supplemental Briefing Order issued by the Court on January 30. 2017 gave the 
parties the option to submit supplemental or replacement briefs. See A 19 - Supplemental 
Briefing Order. HoweveL the Order directs that ··such a brief should be submitted only if 
the posture before the Supreme Court creates a material difference in the argument 
presented.~~ Id. The County·s Replacement Brief does not conform with the Supplemental 
Briefing Order because the County presents arguments not included in its original brief and 
the posture before the Supreme Court does not create a material difference in the original 
arguments presented. 
The County has impermissibly construed the Court·s Supplemental Briefing Order 
as an invitation to. after the case was fully briefed and ready for oral argument before the 
Court of Appeals. present alternate arguments ,,vhich were not addressed in its original 
brief. The County" s first issue regarding the statute of limitations was not included in the 
original brief. Likewise. its fourth issue regarding limiting the retroactive effect of the 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
Court·s decision is newly raised. Compare A10 - Aples. ~ Original Br .. 3-4. and Aples." 
Replacement Br .. 3-4. The County cites no material differences created by the posture 
before the Supreme Court which ,vould justify its submission of a Replacement Brief or its 
introduction of ne,,· argument. 
In In re Guardianship of A.T.I.G .. 293 P.3d 276 (Utah 2012). another case in which 
the Court granted the parties permission to submit supplemental briefs only "if the posture 
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before the Supreme Court creates a material difference in the argument presented~" the 
Court determined that the posture before the Supreme Court did not create a material 
difference in the arguments presented to the court of appeals~ found that an issue raised 
only in a supplemental brief was not within the scope of its order and declined to consider 
the issue. Id. at ,r 48. Here. as in A. T.I.G., "neither party has cause to raise anything which 
would amount to a material difference in the arguments presented in the ... initial 
briefing." Id. Accordingly. it is improper for the County to raise ne,v arguments in a 
supplemental briefing. 
Because the posture before the Supreme Court does not create a material difference 
in the arguments presented. the Court should not consider the arguments raised in the 
Countf s replacement brief. The County had the opportunity to make any argument it 
chose in its initial briefing. but should not be allowed to re-brief the case with entirelv new 
~ ~ 
argument after having reviewed the Hammons· Reply Brief and without a showing of a 
material difference. simply because it had the good fortune to have the Supreme Court elect 
to recall this case. It would be prejudicial to the Appellants if the Court were to condone 
the Countis actions. and the Court should strike the County·s Replacement Brief. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER THE COUNTY'S STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT, BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RAISED IN THE 
COUNTY'S ORIGINAL BRIEF AND THE POSTURE BEFORE THE 
SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CREATE A MATERIAL DIFFERENCE IN 
THE ARGUMENT PRESENTED. IF THE COURT DOES CONSIDER 
THIS ARGUMENT, IT SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE THE 
DISCOVERY RULE APPLIES. 
The County did not argue that the Hammons· claims were brought late in their 
original brief. In fact~ the phrase "'statute of limitations'~ does not appear anywhere in the 
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original brie[ and Wilson v. Weber Countv~ 111 P.2d 14 7 (Utah 1941) is not cited 
anywhere in the record. The County has made no showing that the posture before the 
Supreme Court creates a material difference in the argument presented. and cannot make 
this claim regarding a statute of limitations argument~ which is certainly ,vi thin the purview 
of the Court of Appeals, which would have been bound by the authority cited in support of 
this argument which was not cited in the original brief. As discussed above~ under its 
Supplemental Briefing Order and its ruling in A.T.I.G.~ the Court should decline to 
consider this argument. 
If the Court does consider the argument. the standard of review is articulated as: 
"[b ]ecause we are reviewing a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. this court 
accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true: we then consider such allegations 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff{ s]." 
Moss v. Parr ·waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. 2012 UT 42. ,- 3. 285 P.3d 1157 (2012). 
(internal citations omitted). The court has also stated that •"[i]t is well established that this 
court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record ... [o]f course. the converse is also true: we ,viii not affirm a 
judgment if the alternate ground or theory is not apparent on the record ... [t]hus. to be 
"apparent on the record" requires more than mere assumption or absence of evidence 
contrary to the [alternate] ground or theory. The record must contain sufficient and 
uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or theory to place a person of ordinary 
intelligence on notice that the prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal." Francis v. 
State. Utah Div. of Wildlife Resources. 2010 UT 62. ~ 19. 248 P.3d 44 (2010) .. 
Page 9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'"As a general rule, a statute of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the 
last event necessary to complete the cause of action.'' Mevers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 
86 (Utah 1981 ). However, Utah courts have long applied the discovery rule to toll the 
statute of limitation when equity demands. The "equitable discovery rule" articulated in 
Russell Packard v Carson, 108 P .3d 7 41 (Utah 2005), applies ··( 1) where a plaintiff does 
not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendanf s concealment or 
misleading conduct, and (2) where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust. regardless of any showing that 
the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.'' Id. at~ 25. 
Here, the equitable discovery rule applies for both stated reasons. First. the County 
concealed facts and mislead the Hammons when it concealed the belated passage of 
County Ordinance 2010-21 ~ neglected to inform the Hammons of overpaid taxes, did not 
provide notice of the appeal process for residential classification. misinformed the 
Hammons regarding the timing for appeals, and refused to respond to the Hammons' 
claims for relief in 2012 with particularity as required by administrative rule. (R. 4. ~ 23. R. 
5. ~~ 26. 29, 35, R. 6, ~41-44. 46.) Additionally. the facts of this case present exceptional 
circumstances ,vhich would render application of the general rule irrational or unjust. 
Under the facts presented in the Complaint, with all reasonable inferences dravm therefrom 
considered in a light most favorable to them, the Hammons did not know and reasonably 
could not have discovered the facts underlying their causes of action in time to commence 
an action within the limitations period. Accordingly. the discovery rule should operate to 
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toll the statute of limitations until the time the Hammons discovered facts which made 
them aware of the existence of each element of each cause of action. 
The Hammons submitted a petition to the assessor in the Fall of 2012 for a refund of 
taxes overpaid in 2007 and 2008 based on a mistake in the residential classification. (R. 
6-7.) The assessor denied their petition in a letter dated 25 October 2012 which directed 
them to appeal to the Weber County Tax Review Committee if they disagreed. (R. 47-48.) 
The Hammons did appeal and the requested relief was again denied. The Tax Review 
Committee then informed them that any further appeal would be ,vith the County 
Commission. (R. 6-7.) In the process of this review. on 10 December 2012. the Hammons 
discovered that WCO 2010-21. the ordinance allowed by section 103 .5. had not been 
enacted until 31 August 2010. and was not in effect at the time the assessor required them 
to submit a signed statement of primary residence as a condition of having the residential 
exemption reinstated. (R.6. ~ 49.) It was at this time. more than 4 years after the last 
payment in question was made on 24 November 2008. that the Hammons became mvare of 
the final element of their causes of action for the assessor" s illegal acts. the county" s failure 
to notify of illegally collected taxes. the county· s failure to credit illegally collected taxes 
against the current yea( s taxes, fraudulent non-disclosure. fraudulent concealmenL 
negligent misrepresentation. unjust enrichment. negligence. and fraud. (R. 7-16.) 
Given the Countv's concealment of kev information. the Hammons neither 
~ ~ 
discovered nor reasonably should have discovered the facts underlying their causes of 
action before the limitations period expired. Therefore. the concealment version of the 
discovery rule operates to toll the limitations period. ,vhich does not commence until the 
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date the Hammons possessed actual or constructive knowledge of the facts fonning the 
basis of their causes of action. Russell Packard v Carson. 108 P.3d 741, ~ 29~ (Utah 2005). 
The recent Highlands at Jordanelle case, while not controlling on this Court, dealt 
with facts similar to those at hand. In Highlands, the Court of Appeals found that lump 
sum fire protection fees were charged to Mountain Resort without implementation by 
Wasatch County of an authorizing resolution or legislative act to justify the lump sum fees. 
The court refused to impute complete knowledge of the state of the la\"\1 at the time the fees 
were collected to Mountain Resort. and instead stated that ··Mountain Resort could have 
reasonably assumed that the lump sum fees [which Wasatch County held out to be valid] 
were authorized by some other resolution.'~ Highlands at Jordanelle. LLC v. Wasatch 
Cntv., 355 P.3d 1047. 2015 UT App. 173 (Utah App. 2015). ~ 43. The Highlands court 
found that although there were no allegations of concealment, because of the substantial 
hardship the statute of limitations would impose on Mountain Resort and the lack of 
prejudice to the Fire District, the exceptional circumstances version of the equitable 
discovery rule applied. Id. at ~~ 45-46. 
Similarly. under the facts of this case~ Weber County held out that its actions were 
valid and the Hammons reasonably assumed that the assessor· s actions were authorized by 
statute until they learned of the County's belated adoption of WCO 20 I 0-21. However. 
here, the County intentionally mislead and concealed facts related to the ordinance, which 
triggers the concealment version of the discovery rule. In addition. strict enforcement of 
the statute of limitations would cause severe hardship to the Hammons. as their claims 
could not be pursued. and prejudice to th~ County due to tolling is minimal as their ability 
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to defend has not been negatively affected. so the exceptional circumstances version 
should also apply. 
From the time the Hammons discovered that the County had not passed the required 
ordinance. they proceeded diligently and reasonably to pursue their claims. by continuing 
the appeal process with Weber County. submitting a summary of argument on 13 
December 2012 as requested by the County. filing a Notice of Claim on 19 June 2013~ and 
then by filing an action with the District Court on 12 August 2014. which was well within 
the four-year limitations period commencing from the date the Hammons became mvare of 
the illegalitv of the assessor· s actions. 
... ol 
The district court. after revie,ving pleadings and hearing oral argument on the 
Countf s Motion to Dismiss. adopted the reasoning in the Hammons· brief on the motion 
and held that the facts of the case~ as alleged by the Hammons. satisfied both the 
.. concealment or misleading conduce and ··exceptional circumstances·· requirements for 
equitable tolling. (R. 166-170. 110-113 ). The district court was ··satisfied that the 
complaint alleges that infonnation was provided to the plaintiffs that could be fairly 
characterized as misleading.·· and that the --conversations alleged between the plaintiffs 
and the defendants were sufficiently misleading that the statute of limitations should be 
tolled.~- (R. 166-169. ~~ I. 4 ). The court also held that ··[ r ]efusing tolling under this 
circumstance ,vould be unjust because it requires citizens to distrust their government 
officials.·· Id. 
Because the record does not contain sufficient and uncontroverted evidence to 
support a decision barring the Hammons· claims on statute of limitations grounds. and 
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does contain information to support the findings of the district court, this Court should find 
that the statute of limitations was tolled by the equitable discovery rule, as the district court 
did. As previously noted, this ruling was not challenged by the County in its original brief. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE 
COUNTY ASSESSOR WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY WHEN HE RECLASSIFIED THE 
HAMMONS' PROPERTY AS A NON-PRIMARY RESIDENCE WITHOUT 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION. 
A. The county board of equalization (BOE) has clear statutory authority over the 
primary residential exemption. 
The BOE. and not the assessor, has the statutory authority and duty to make 
determinations regarding revocation of the primary residential exemption. The County 
urges for a harmonious reading of the statutes that make up the Utah Property Tax Act, yet 
it ignores the clear grant of authority for exemptions to the BOE found in Utah Code 
§59-2-1002. §59-2-1102. and §59-2-103 .5. by failing altogether to address these 
provisions in its brief. The assessor does have a statutory duty to ··assess all property .. 
(Utah Code §59-2-30 I) and to "'become fully acquainted with all property .. (Utah Code 
§59-2-303 \ but the County tries to persuade the Court to someho\\1 morph this language 
into an implied authority for the assessor to unilaterally revoke the residential exemption. 
The County relies on a both a logical fallacy and a misstatement of the provisions of 
Utah Code § 59-2-103 (section 103) when it asserts that "[b ]ecause the county assessor is 
charged with the duty to assess county property. and because residential property should be 
assessed at forty-five percent less than fair market value. but only for one primary 
residence per household. the county assessor must determine whether the residential 
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property being assessed satisfies the requirements for the residential exemption.·· (Aples.' 
Replacement Br. at 42.) While it is true that the assessor must assess county property, 
section 103 does not say that property ··should be assessed at forty-five percent less than 
full market value'· as the County claims. Instead section I 03 states that ·-rhe fair market 
value ... shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential exemption. (Emphasis added.) 
It does not logically follow that because the assessor determines the market value for a 
property. he is also responsible for determining whether the exemption should apply. or 
more specifically. when a previously granted exemption should be revoked. Section 103 
contains no language to suggest let alone mandate. that the assessor perform this function 
and the County has not pointed to any other statute that expressly directs the assessor to do 
so. 
In stark contrast to the assessor's lack of specific authority for exemptions. the BOE 
is under a clear statutory mandate to ··use all information it may gain from the records of 
the county or elsewhere in equalizing the assessment of the property in the county or in 
determining any exemptions:· Utah Code §59-2-1002. The BOE"s responsibility for 
exemptions is repeated in §59-2-103 .5 which states that·· ... a county board of equalization 
shall allow ... a residential exemption ... •·. and that allmvs for a statement to be requested if 
•· ... the county board of equalization detennines that there is reason to believe that that 
residential property no longer qualifies for the residential exemption in accordance with 
Section 59-2- 103 :· 
Utah Code §59-2-1102 (section 1102) is also instructive regarding the question of 
where the authority to allO\\: or revoke the residential exemption lies. This section of the 
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code is titled, in part: "Determination of exemptions by the board of equalization'' and it 
governs all "'Property assessed under Part 3, County Assessment.'· Part 3, in §59-2-30 I. 
states that the assessor shall assess all property located within the county ... '\ but section 
1102 clearly states that the board of equalization has authority to determine, and, after 
giving proper notice and due process. including an opportunity for hearing, revoke 
exemptions. In A.E .. Inc. v. Summit County Comm'n, 2001 UT App 322, 35 P.3d 1153, 
A.E. argued that section 1102 did not apply to residential exemptions, but the Court held 
that ··[ s ]ection 59-2-1102(3) contains no such limiting language'' and that the ··residential 
exemption," .. .is clearly subject to section 59-2-1102(3 )'s sweeping mandate.'' Id. at ,-r 12. 
Although the specific subsection being challenged in A.E. is not applicable here, the 
Court's finding that section 1102 applies to the residential exemption is still in force. 
The County argues that section I 03 .5 was implemented in the wake of A.E. and that 
it "did not abrogate section 103 's limitation on residential exemptions to one primary 
residence per household." (Aples: Replacement Br., 4 7 .) The County is mistaken, in that 
the provisions of section 103( 4) which limit the residential exemption to one residence per 
household were enacted bv Senate Bill 120 in 2004 and did not take effect until Januarv I. 
~ r 
2005. while the provisions of section I 03.5 which spell out the BOE's authority and 
responsibility for exemptions were implemented by House Bill 305 during the 2002 
general legislative session and took effect on January L 2003. two years before the changes 
to section I 03. (R.465/56: 11-21 t See also A2 I. H.B. 305 and A22, S.B. 120. 
Prior to the 2005 amendment to section I 03, all property used for residential 
purposes was eligible for the residential exemption, subject.to a limit of one acre of land 
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per residential unit. Section I 03.5 was enacted in conjunction with changes to sections 
I IO I and 1102 to allow a countf s BOE to waive the initial application requirement, but 
also to maintain the ability to request signed statements if the BOE had reason to believe 
that a property no longer qualified for the exemption; provided that the county had passed 
an enabling ordinance. 
The 2003 enactment of section 103.5 did nothing to change the division of 
responsibility between the assessor and the BOE. The assessor never had the authority to 
remove the residential exemption. Prior to section 103 .5 · s enactment and now. it was and 
is the assessor~ s job to determine market value and investigate property characteristics. but 
it is the BOE~s job to govern exemptions. to act on information supplied by the assessor. 
and to provide taxpayers with notice and opportunity for hearing to determine whether a 
property should be reclassified to remove a previously-granted exemption. As shown. the 
BOE~s responsibility over exemptions was established prior to any implied duty to confirm 
primary residential status that the County feels the assessor may have under section I 03. 
If the Utah Property Tax act is to be ··read harmoniously"" as the County urges. it would be 
odd to assume that the legislature had provided the assessor with a vague~ implied. and 
redundant authority to revoke residential exemptions when the BOE is clearly empowered 
and directed by statute ,vith the authority and responsibility to do so. ·"'In matters of pure 
statutory interpretation. an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and 
gives no deference to its legal conclusions." Moreover. when called upon to interpret a 
statute. "our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose 
the statute ,vas meant to achieve." The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the 
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legislature in enacting a statute is the plain language of the statute. "We therefore look first 
to the statute's plain language."'" Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center. Inc., 2000 UT 90, 15 
P.3d 1030 (2000), ~ 7, (internal citations omitted). The Court is also obligated to preserve 
legislative intent by avoiding statutory interpretation which would result in an absurd result 
and to '"construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer.'· See State ex rel. Z.C.. 
2007 UT 54, 165 P.3d 1206 (2007). and ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n~ 2003 
UT 53, 86 P .3d 706. ~ 19 (2003 ). Here, it would be absurd to interpret the statutory 
scheme to allow the assessor to avoid notice and hearing requirements. and to unilaterally 
make exemption determinations which are clearly the responsibility of the BOE. 
In response to the question posed by the County in its original brief: ··Who else [but 
the assessor] would enforce the statutory limitations on the residential exemption found in 
section I 03 r (A20. 25), the legislature and the Hammons together clearly respond: ··the 
BOE.'' This Court should give heed to the plain language of the statutes in question and 
find that the assessor did not have authority to revoke the residential exemption and that he 
acted illeQ:allv when he did so . 
._ .,I 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE 
COUNTY ASSESSOR WAS PERMITTED TO REQUIRE A SIGNED 
STATEMENT OF PRIMARY RESIDENCE AS A CONDITION OF 
MAINTAINING PRIMARY RESIDENCE CLASSIFICATION PRIOR TO 
THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORDINANCE REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE 
§59-2-103.5. 
A. Prior to enacting Weber County Ordinance 2010-21 the County lacked the 
authority to require a statement in order for the residential exemption to be 
allowed. 
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When section 59-2-103 .5 was enacted in 2002. it contained a clear invitation from 
the legislature for counties to enact an ordinance allowing them~ acting through the board 
of equalization, to require a signed statement ··certifying that the residential property is 
residential property.·· Utah Code §59-2-103 .5( I). The statement could be required both as 
a condition for initially being awarded the residential exemption and in a case where the 
BOE has determined that there is a reason the exemption should be revoked. Id. For 
unknown reasons, the legislative body of Weber County neglected to enact the ordinance 
for more than seven years. 
When Weber County Ordinance 2010-21 was finally enacted in 20 I 0. it clearly 
stated. on its face. that its purpose was to allow the County the ability to require a property 
mvner to file a sifmed statement. an abilitv that the text of the ordinance admits the Countv 
..... - -' . 
did not have prior to the enactment of the ordinance required by section 103 .5. A 14 - WCO 
2010-21. In its brief. the County completely ignores the plain language of its O\Vn 
ordinance and makes no attempt to explain why the Countf s stated understanding of 
section 103 .5 in 2010 differs so dramatically from the position it has taken in defending 
this action. 
B. The assessor did not act under the authority of, or in compliance with, Utah 
Code §§ 306 and 307. 
Lacking any authority from section 103 .5. the County states that the assessor was 
operating under authority from sections 306 and 307 when he required that the Hammons 
submit a Signed Statemenr of Primary Residence as a condition for reinstating application 
of the residential exemptions. ( Aples. · Replacement Br. at 43-44.) However. once again 
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the County completely ignored the questions raised in the Hammons' brief; namely - if the 
assessor required the Hammons to submit the signed statement under authority from 
sections 306 and 307, why did he fail to comply with the prescribed form. notice, timing, 
procedure, fees, and penalties? 
Even if the Court were to find that the assessor did, as the County asserts, act under 
authority from section 307 when he required the signed statement, the Court must still find 
that the assessor acted illegally due to his failure to comply with the content, notice and 
penalty provisions of sections 306 and 307. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE 
TIME LIMITS IMPOSED BY UTAH CODE §59-2-1004 ARE APPLICABLE 
TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE COUNTY NOTIFY THE 
PROPERTY OWNER OF ERRONEOUSLY OR ILLEGALLY ASSESSED 
TAXES AND TO THE REQUIREMENT TO CREDIT ERRONEOUS OR 
ILLEGALLY ASSESSED TAXES UNDER WEBER COUNTY 
ORDINANCE 6-14-3 AND 6-14-5 AND UTAH CODE §59-2-1321. 
A. The Hammons' claim is clearly for illegally or erroneously overpaid taxes, and 
therefore it falls under the purview of Utah Code §59-2-1321 (section 1321) 
and Weber County Ordinances (WCO) 6-14-3 and 6-14-5. 
Utah Code § 1321 applies in cases where ··a taxpayer can point to an error of fact or 
law in the collection of the tax ... that is readily apparent from county records.'· Woodburv 
Amsource. Inc. v. Salt Lake Countv, 2003 UT 28. ~ 14. 73 P.3d 362~ 367. The Hammons 
request that this Court determine that the assessor's reclassification of their property so as 
to make it ineligible for the residential exemption and his requirement that a signed 
statement be submitted prior to reinstatement of the exemption were errors in law. The 
assessor's assumption that the property was not a primary residence due to the P.O. Box 
address was an erro~ in fact, because the property was in continuous ~se as a primary 
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residence from the time it was built in 2005. The District Court correctly understood that 
--at the end of the day, it ,vas determined that the reclassification was in errort (R. 
465/68:6-7 .) Because the Hammons continuously used the home as their primary 
residence, the taxes resulting from the County·s failure to apply the primary residential 
exemption were clearly overpaid and the County was bound by section 1321 and WCO 
6-14-5 to refund or apply a credit for erroneously or illegally collected taxes. 
In 2007. the County removed the residential exemption based solely on the 
Hammons' P.O. Box mailing address (R.39.), and informed the Hammons that the address 
needed to be corrected~ but then did not credit or refund the overpaid taxes. or change the 
classification when the mailing address was changed on the County~ s records to the 
physical address of the property in 2008. (R.40.) The changed address. ,vhich removed the 
only indicia of non-primary residence which the County had relied on to deny the 
exemption. made the County's mistake in reclassification. and thus the erroneously or 
illegally collected taxes ··readily apparent.'· Id. The County was again put on notice of the 
Hammons' overpaid taxes when they submitted the Signed Statement of Prima,y 
Residence in 2009 which clearly stated that the home had been occupied as a primary 
residence since Fall of 2005. (R.41.) Again. the County failed to notify the Hammons as 
required by WCO 6-14-3 or to refund or credit the overpayment. 
The County· s position is that this notice of error ,vas insufficient. and that it would 
have had to have undertaken some sort of investigation to discover the argued error. The 
County argues that if the notice provided by the Hammons ,vas deemed to be ··readily 
apparent'~ it ,vould need to monitor every communication from a third party to avoid tax 
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liability. (Aples.' Replacement Br. at 39.) In fact, no extra investigation or monitoring was 
required, because the Hammons' communications were in direct response to the 
instructions received from the County when they inquired about the erroneous 
reclassification. The corrected address form which removed the question that initially 
caused the County to revoke the exemption was processed by the assessor's office and used 
as a basis to change the address on County records. If the address alone was sufficient 
information to prompt removal of the exemption, should a change not have triggered some 
sort of inquiry as to whether the exemption should be reinstated? The Signed Statement of 
Prima,:v Residence was the form the County relied on to finally change the property 
classification back to ··primary residentiat'· which surely required the County to closely 
review its contents in order to make that determination. (R.41.) In addition. County 
Ordinance 20 I 0-21. as documented in the County's records. clearly states that prior to its 
enactment in 2010, the county did not have ~'the ability to request necessary documentation 
to substantiate whether or not a property is entitled to a primary residential exemption.'' 
(R.24.) These three pieces of information. all readily apparent from county records, 
combined with section 103 .5. substantiate the errors of fact or law that resulted in a tax 
overpayment by the Hammons. 
After incorrectly finding that the assessor· s actions were legal and not in error. the 
District Court erroneously held that the Hammons' only avenue to obtain a refund or credit 
of overpaid taxes was under Utah Code §59-2-1004. (R.432-436). In fact because there 
were errors in both fact and law as explained above and because the County provided 
notice of.the appeal process only for market values and did not provide notice of the appeal 
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process for appeals of property classifications (R.4 at ~23. 22~ 31-33, 35), the Hammons 
request for refund or credit under section 1321 was propeL and the time limits and process 
for an appeal under section 1004 did not apply. 
The Hammons continue to assert. and urge this Court to find, that their appeal for 
erroneous or illegally collected taxes under section 1321 was proper. that it was not subject 
to the time limits and other requirements of section I 004~ that the County had an obligation 
to notify them of the overpayment under WCO 6-14-3. and that under the plain language 
of WCO 6-14-5~ refunds for overpayment of taxes in prior years which are not ··refunded 
on or before August I 5, of the year following the overpayment the County Treasurer shall 
apply the overpayment against the current year·s real property tax on that same piece of 
propertf· where ··current year'· means the year in which the claim is made. WCO 6-14-5. 
B. Estoppel does not apply. 
Even if the Court determines that the assessor·s actions ,:vere not illegal. the 
Hammons are not estopped from seeking a credit under section I 321. as alleged in the 
Countf s original brief. (Aples· Original Br.. 37-38.) In their Complaint the Hammons 
alleged that notice was not sufficient (R.4 at ,23 ), that their residential address was 
changed on County records prior to 2008 (R.5 at ~27). that the County denied the 
exemption despite the address being changed on the County records (R.5 at ~30). that their 
Statement of Primarv Residence. filed ,vith the Countv in 2009. clearlv stated that thev had 
_, . . .. 
occupied their home as a primary residence since ··f ALL 2005·· (R.5 at ~~32-33 ). and that 
the County failed to issue a refund or credit of overpaid taxes (R.5 at ~36). Each of these 
statements ,,,as incorporated into each cause of action. (See i.e .. R.8 at ~67). This case 
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does not run afoul of Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
because the Hammons alleged all facts necessary for recovery under section 1321. 
While the Hammons agreed that several of their causes of action could be resolved 
based on "the court's interpretation of §59-2-103 and §59-2-103.5 and related sections of 
the Utah Code" (R.248), section I 004 and section 1321 are certainly code sections related 
to the reclassification and overpayment. The District Court heard argument on the issue, 
stated that "at the end of the day~ it was determined that the reclassification was in error'· 
(R. 465/68 :6-7), and ruled on its interpretation of the application of sections I 004 and 
1321. (R.432-434.) This Court should find that the County was obligated to provide 
notice of and credit for Hammons· property tax overpayments. 
VI. THE COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE GIVEN RETROSPECTIVE AND 
PROSPECTIVE EFFECT BECAUSE THERE IS NO CHANGE IN LAW, 
AND THE COUNTY HAS NOT SHOWN JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE OR 
UNDUE BURDEN. 
The County argues for the first time in its Replacement Brief that any decision by 
the Court adverse to the County should be limited to only prospective application. 
Because this argument was not raised in its initial brief and because the County has made 
~ ~ 
no showing that the posture before the Supreme Court creates a material difference in the 
argument presented~ the Court should disregard this argument. 
If the Court does consider this issue. it should follow the general rule ofretroactivity 
for civil cases. which ··from time immemorial is that the ruling of a court is deemed to state 
the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively .... in the vast majority [ of 
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civil cases] a decision is effective both prospectively and retrospectively. even an 
overruling decision.~~ Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (1984)~ 676. 
The Court later qualified that in rare cases~ it ··will deviate from the default rule of 
retroactivity and apply our decision prospectively only when two requirements are met. 
First~ the ruling must result from a change in the law that significantly alter[ s] the legal 
landscape by ending or overruling a relied-upon practice. But it is not enough to make a 
"bare assertion ... that our decision overrules prior cases. because the party seeking 
prospective application of the ruling must also show either justifiable reliance on the prior 
state of the law. or that retroactive application ,vould create an undue burden. Monarrez v. 
Utah Department of Transportation. 368 P.3d 846. ii 28. (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). Here. as explained belmv~ these requirements are not met. and therefore the 
general rule should be follO\:ved. 
a. A decision in favor of the Hammons would not result in a significant alteration 
in the legal landscape or in the ending or over-ruling of a relied-upon practice. 
A decision by the Court in this case that the County assessor" s conduct ·was 
unauthorized. that the Hammons· claims fall within Section 1321 · s scope .. or that the 
Hammons· claims are timely would not overturn any of the cases cited by the County. 
Such a decision would only clarify the application of well-established legal principals to 
those rulings. The Wilson opinion would remain undisturbed. because the applicable 
statute of limitations ,vas tolled here by the discovery rule. consistent with Russell Packard 
v. Carson. Woodburv Amsource regarding section 1321 claims would also stand~ because 
the County's reclassification of the Hammons· primary residential status was an error in 
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fact and the illegality of the assessor's actions were errors in law which are readily apparent 
from County records. As explained above, the County has pointed to no statute which 
would be invalidated or precedent which would be overturned if the Court decides in the 
Hammons' favor, instead, such a decision would '"not [be] a departure from a prior 
understanding of the statute[ s]. It [ would] simply confirm the plain meeting of the 
statute ... ,~ Monarrez,~ 31. Like Monarrez, a decision here that the language of the 
statutes is unambiguous would leave little room for the decision to be applied only 
prospectively. Id. 
b. The County has not shown justifiable reliance or that retroactive application 
would create an undue burden. 
The County does not show justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law, because 
the County assessor did not comply with the law. It is clear from the language of Weber 
County Ordinance 2010-21 that the Countv understood that the actions of its assessor were 
~ ~ 
not justified. The Ordinance is titled '"A(sic) ORDINANCE ALLOWING THE 
COUNTY TO REQUIRE EVIDENCE OF A PRIMARY RESIDENCE FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF CLAIMING THE PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION~· and states 
that ··the county intends to update the Board of Equalization Policy to be able to obtain 
infonnation needed to verify a property's qualifications for the primary residence 
exemption.~· (R.56.) Clearly. it was the County's understanding that it. including its 
assessoL did not have the ability to request documentation to substantiate whether or not a 
property is entitled to the residential exemption prior to the ordinance required by section 
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I 03 .5. Id. The County has not cited any controlling authority ,vhich would be overturned 
if the Court finds that the assessor·s actions were not justified by law. 
In addition, the County's claims of reliance on the Wilson decision as it relates to 
the statute of limitations are not justified, because the Wilson case is not cited anywhere in 
the record or in the County's previous brief. Apparently. the County only became aware of 
the Wilson decision as it drafted its Replacement Brief, and therefore cannot claim prior 
reliance. Furthermore, application of the discovery rule is well-documented in our case 
law and its application here would not upset precedent. 
The Countis bare assertions of undue burden are also insufficient to merit 
limitation of the effect of the Court's decision. The Court. in ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Com'n. declined to apply its decision retrospectively regarding the interpretation 
of oil deficiency assessment taxes due to a concern regarding the potential burden of large 
refunds of taxes already collected and spent. Id. at ~ 23. However. the Court revisited 
this decision in Union Oil Co. of California v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 2009 UT 78. 222 
P. 3d 1158 (2009) and reached a different result in a situation where. if a taxpayer 
prevailed. --the government would never be required to pay out funds already collected. 
The only possible adverse result suffered by the state ... is a failure to receive additional tax 
revenue from a tax payer."" Id. at ~19. Here. under the provisions of Weber County 
Ordinance 6-14-5. if an overpayment is not refunded by August 15 of the year following 
the overpayment. the County Treasurer shall apply the overpayment against the current 
year"s real property tax on that same piece of property:· \VCO 6-14-15. Therefore. as 
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in Union Oil, the County would not be required to pay out funds already collected, but 
would only credit overpaid amounts against current taxes, affecting only future tax 
revenue. The County has not alleged that a large number of taxpayers would be affected 
by the assessor's unauthorized actions. Presumably, the number is small and no undue 
burden would be incurred if the Court issued a ruling tailored to the facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the facts of this case and the applicable statutory framework, the assessor 
clearly overstepped his statutory authority when he reclassified the Hammons' property 
from primary to non-primary residential, thereby revoking the primary residential 
exemption that had been applied for the two previous years without proper notice. 
opportunity for hearing, or the involvement of the BOE. 
The assessor again violated the law when he required the Hammons to submit a 
Signed Statement of Primary Residence as a condition for reinstatement of the primary 
residential exemption. This was improper because only the BOE is statutorily empowered 
to require this particular statement and also because the County had not enacted the 
enabling ordinance required by section 103 .5. The assessor ,vas not acting under 
authority from sections 306 and 307 when he required the statement, because he did not 
comply with the requirements of those sections. 
The Hammons· appeal of overpaid taxes was not governed by section 1004. because 
the County only provided notice of the process for appeals of market value and did not 
provide instructions for appealing mistakes in residential classification. Section 1321 and 
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the related Weber County ordinances direct that overpaid taxes should be credited to the 
Hammons because their overpayments ,vere due to the County's mistakes of law and fact 
and the mistakes were clearly evident from County records. 
The Hammons' claim is not barred by the Statute of Limitations because the 
discovery rule is triggered by the County's concealment, failure to notify~ and the 
exceptional circumstances of this case. 
The ruling of this case should, following the general rule. be applied both 
retrospectively and prospectively~ because the County has not shown that a decision here 
will cause a major alteration in the legal landscape. nor has it shown that it justifiably relied 
on any prior state of the law or that retrospective application of a decision adverse to it 
would create an undue burden. 
For the foregoing reasons. the District Courf s order should be reversed and the 
.... .... 
Hammons should be awarded judgment against the County consistent with their complaint. 
including damages. prejudgment interest. attorney fees and costs. and other relief in Ia,,/, 
and equity. 
DATED this day of . 2 0 1 7. 
------
SCOTT L. HANSEN 
AttorneJ for Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
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The Order of the Court is stated below: 
Dated: January 30, 2017 
11:30:47 AM 
,' '< ! ~ \•'.,, ~-.,, 
~- ,'· 
/s/ LISA A. COLLINS ,,.,, · : 
Interim Clerk of the Suprem~-:court 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




Weber County, Weber County 
Commission, Jan Zogmaister, 




SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ORDER 
Appellate Case No. 20151074 
This matter was recalled from the Court of Appeals. 
Within eleven (11) calendar clays, the Parties must advise this court if they will, or "'rill 
not file a replacement or supplemental brief. With respect to the briefs already filed, the 
parties will be permitted to file supplemental or replacement briefs, if they choose. 
However, such a brief should be submitted only if the posture before the Supreme Court 
creates a material difference in the argument presented (e.g., the argument already 
briefed relied on authority that would be binding on the Court of Appeals but not on the 
Supreme Court). This order shall not be construed to excuse compliance with otherwise-
applicable principles or rules of appellate review (e.g., preservation in the trial court). 
If submitted in the form of a supplement, the brief shall clearly indicate Supplemental 
Brief on its cover and shall be limited to fifteen pages ( or ten pages for a reply brief) or 
less and shall comply with Supreme Court Standing Order No. 11 and with Rule 27 of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. It also may include a separate table of authorities limited 
to the citations provided by the supplemental analysis. Compliance with other 
formatting and content provisions of the appellate rules, including the binding and color 
cover requirements described by subparts (c) and (d) of rule 27, is not required for a 
supplemental brief. 
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If submitted in the form of a replacement, the brief shall clearly indicate Replacement 
Brief on its cover and shall comply with all applicable rules, including Supreme Court 
Standing Order No.11, and page or word count limitations, subject to any variances 
previously afforded to the original brief. 
Appellants supplemental or replacement brief, if any, shall be submitted on or before 
March 1, 2017. Upon service of Appellee's brief or notice that Appellant does not intend 
to submit a supplemental or replacement brief, Appellee shall have thirty (30) days to 
submit a supplemental or replacement brief under the same terms noted above. 
Appellants reply, if any, shall be filed within twenty (20) days of service of Appellees 
brief. 
This Court will not accept any motions for an over length supplemental or replacement 
pleading. No eA1:ensions of time will be granted. 
End of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-
3-102(3)G)1. This Court obtained jurisdiction when this appeal was transferred to 
it by order on 22 December 2015 as permitted by Utah Code § 78A-3-102(4). 
ISSUES AND STA..N'DARDS OF REVIEW 
First Issue. Whether the district court correctly held that the county 
assessor did not violate state law when he withdrew a statutory residential 
property tax exemption for primary residences from the appellants' property 
until they provided a statement confirming that it was their primary residence, 
regardless whether the county had adopted an ordinance that would have allowed 
its board of equalization to require a similar statement before a property owner 
could receive the exemption. 
Standard of Review and Preservation: Correctness. The district court made 
the challenged holding when it granted in part the appellees' motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. That decision is reviewed for correctness. vVest v. 
Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, ,r 4, 139 P.3d 1059. A grant of a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings is affirmed '"only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff 
could not recover under the facts alleged."' Id. (quoting Golding v. Ashley Cent. 
Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)). The facts from the complaint are 
1 Appellees cite to statutes' current versions unless specified othenvise. 
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taken as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. Id. Moreover, this issue is also a question of statutory in~erpretation, 
also reviewed for correctness. State v. Steele, 2010 lIT App 185, ,r 12, 236 P.3d 161 
("Issues involving interpretation of statutes and common law are questions of 
law, reviewed for correctness."). This issue is preserved at R.0429-0432. 
Second Issue. Whether, should the Court affirm that the county assessor 
acted ·within his authority, it need also decide if, upon receiving the appellants' 
statement that the property had been their primary residence during the years 
the assessor withheld the exemption, the county must have notified them that 
they had overpaid and applied those alleged overpayments toward their taxes, 
even though the appellants' claims presume that the county assessor lacked the 
authority to withhold the exemption. 
Standard of Review and Preservation: Correctness. This issue is also a 
review of a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings and is accordingly 
reviewed for correctness for the same reasons explained for the first issue. 
Although the district court did not decide this issue, it is preserved at R.0215-
0217; R.0248; R.0465/83:24-87:22. This issue presents an alternative ground for 
affirmance. State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r 9, 76 P.3d 1159 ("[A]n appellate 
court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory 
differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, ... 
8 
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."' (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ,r 10, 52 P.3d 1158) (quotation marks 
and citations omitted)). 
Third Issue. Whether, alternatively, the district court correctly held that, 
upon receiving the appellants' statement that the property at issue had been their 
primary residence during the years the assessor withheld the exemption, the 
county was not required to have notified them that they had overpaid their 
property taxes and applied those alleged overpayments toward their current tax 
obligations because the appellants did not timely appeal the county's allegedly 
erroneous valuation under Utah Code § 59-2-1004. 
Standard of Review and Preservation: Correctness. This issue is reviewed 
for correctness for the same reasons as the first issue. This issue is preserved at 
R.0432-0434. 
KEY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
AND RULES 
1. Utah Code § 59-2-103 (2004) 2 
(1) All tangible taxable property located ·within the state shall be assessed and 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued 
on January 1, unless othervvise provided by law. 
(2) Subject to Subsections (3) and (4), beginning on January 1, 1995, the fair 
market value of residential property located ·within the state shall be reduced by 
2 The 2004 version applied during the relevant time frame, and it is the version 
the County uses in this brief. 
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45%, representing a residential exemption allowed under Utah Constitution 
Article XIII, Section 2. 
(3) No more than one acre of land per residential unit may qualify for the 
residential exemption. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b)(ii), beginning on January 1, 
2005, the residential exemption in Subsection (2) is limited to one primary 
residence per household. 
(b) An owner of multiple residential properties located within the state is 
allowed a residential exemption under Subsection (2) for: 
(i) subject to Subsection (4)(a), the primary residence of the o-vvner; 
and 
(ii) each residential property that is the primary residence of a 
tenant. 
2. Utah Code § 59-2-103.5 (2002) :1 
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a county legislative body may 
by ordinance require that in order for residential property to be allowed a 
residential exemption in accordance with Section 59-2-103, an owner of the 
residential property shall file with the county board of equalization a statement: 
3 The section was amended in 2008 to reflect a changed citation to the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Because the change was not substantive, the 
County refers throughout this brief to the 2002 version. 
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(a) on a form prescribed by the commission by rule; 
(b) signed by all of the owners of the residential property; 
. ;, (c) certifying that the residential property is residential property; and 
( d) containing other information as required by the commission by rule. 
(2) (a) Subject to Section 59-2-103 and except as provided in Subsection (3), a 
county board of equalization shall allow an owner described in Subsection 
(1) a residential exemption for the residential property described in 
Subsection (1) if: 
(i) the county legislative body enacts the ordinance described in 
Subsection (1); and 
(ii) the county board of equalization determines that the 
requirements of Subsection (1) are met. 
(b) A county board of equalization may require an uwner of the residential 
property described in Subsection (1) to file the statement described in 
Subsection (1) only if: 
2204951 OOCXCJ 
(i) that residential property was ineligible for the residential 
exemption authorized under Section 59-2-103 during the calendar 
year immediately preceding the calendar year for which the owner is 
seeking to claim the residential exemption for that residential 
property; 
(ii) an ownership interest in that residential property changes; or 
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(iii) the county board of equalization determines that there is reason 
to believe that that residential property no longer qualifies for the 
residential exemption in accordance with Section 59-2-103. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), if a county legislative body does not enact 
an ordinance requiring an uwner to file a statement in accordance with this 
section, the county board of equalization: 
(a) may not require an owner to file a statement for residential property to 
be eligible for a residential exemption in accordance with Section 59-2-103; 
and 
(b) shall allow a residential exemption for residential property m 
accordance with Section 59-2-103. 
(4) (a) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the commission shall make rules providing: 
II 
(i) the form for the statement described in Subsection (1); and 
(ii) the contents of the form for the statement described m 
Subsection (1). 
(b) The commission shall make the form described in Subsection (4)(a) 
available to counties. 
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3. Utah Code § 59-2-1004 (2007) 4 
(1) (a) A taxpayer dissatisfied with the valuation or the equalization of the 
..J taxpayer's real property may make an application to appeal by: 
·.dJ 
(i) filing the application with the county board of equalization "Within 
the time period described in Subsection (2); or 
(ii) making an application by telephone or other electronic means 
vvithin the time period described in Subsection (2) if the county 
legislative body passes a resolution under Subsection (5) authorizing 
applications to be made by telephone or other electronic means. 
(b) The contents of the application shall be prescribed by rule of the county 
board of equalization. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b ), for purposes of Subsection (1), 
v; a taxpayer shall make an application to appeal the valuation or the 
equalization of the taxpayer's real property on or before the later of: 
(i) September 15 of the current calendar year; or 
(ii) the last day of a 45-day period beginning on the day on which the 
county auditor mails the notice under Subsection 59-2-919(4). 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), in accordance v\rith Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shal1 
4 The statute was amended in 2008, but the changes are immaterial to this 
analysis. The County accordingly cites to the 2007 version in this brief. 
13 
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make rules providing for circumstances under which the county board of 
equalization is required to accept an application to appeal that is filed after 
the time period prescribed in Subsection (2)(a). 
(3) The owner shall include in the application under Subsection (1)(a)(i) the 
ovvner's estimate of the fair market value of the property and any evidence which 
may indicate that the assessed valuation of the owner's property is improperly 
equalized with the assessed valuation of comparable properties. 
(4) (a) The county board of equalization shall meet and hold public hearings as 
prescribed in Section 59-2-1001. 
(b) The county board of equalization shall make a decision on each appeal 
filed in accordance vvith this section within a 60-day period after the day on 
which the application is made. 
(c) The commission may approve the extension of a time period provided 
for in Subsection (4)(b) for a county board of equalization to make a 
decision on an appeal. 
(d) The decision of the board shall contain a determination of the valuation 
of the property based on fair market value, and a conclusion that the fair 
market value is properly equalized "With the assessed value of comparable 
properties. 
(e) If no evidence is presented before the county board of equalization, it 
,,vill be presumed that the equalization issue has been met. 
14 
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(f) 
(i) If the fair market value of the property that is the subject of the 
appeal deviates plus or minus 5% from the assessed value of 
comparable properties, the valuation of the appealed property shall 
be adjusted to reflect a value equalized with the assessed value of 
comparable properties. 
(ii) The equalized value established under Subsection (4)(f)(i) shall 
be the assessed value for property tax purposes until the county 
assessor is able to evaluate and equali-ze the assessed value of all 
comparable properties to bring them all into conformity with full fair 
market value. 
(5) If any taxpayer is dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of 
equalization, the taxpayer may file an appeal with the commission as prescribed 
in Section 59-2-1006. 
( 6) A county legislative body may pass a resolution authorizing taxpayers owing 
taxes on property assessed by that county to file property tax appeals applications 
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4. Utah Code § 59-2-1321 s 
The county legislative body, upon sufficient evidence being produced that 
property has been either erroneously or illegally assessed, may order the county 
treasurer to allow the taxes on that part of the property erroneously or illegally 
assessed to be deducted before payment of taxes. Any taxes, interest, and costs 
paid more than once, or erroneously or illegally collected, may, by order of the 
county legislative body, be refunded by the county treasurer, and the portion of 
taxes, interest, and costs paid to the state or any taxing entity shall be refunded to 
the county, and the appropriate officer shall draw a warrant for that amount in 
favor of the county. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In 2007, the county assessor flagged the appellants' (Hammonses) 
property for investigation into whether it was their primary residence and should 
be receiving the residential exemption (a statutory provision requiring counties 
to reduce by forty-five percent the fair market value used to assess residential 
properties, limited to one primary residence per household). According to the 
County, the assessor sent a letter asking the Hammonses to confirm that the 
property was their primary residence, including a form called a "Signed 
s The statute remains unchanged since the relevant time frame, so the County 
refers to the current version in this brief. 
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Statement of Primary Residence; Pursuant to Section: 59-2-103 and 59-2-307 
UCA," but says it received no response. (R.206; R.0465/33:8-34:20.) Lacking a 
response, the assessor did not apply the residential exemption to the 
Hammonses' property in 2007 and 2008. (R.0033-0034.) The Hammonses paid 
taxes on the full value of their residential property those years (R.0004-0005 at 
11 22, 24, 35-36) without initiating any formal process to challenge the 
assessments. (They contend, however, that at some point they inquired into the 
issue and were told by an unidentified county employee that the time to appeal 
the valuations had run. (R.0005 at ,r,r 28-29.)) 
In early 2009, the Hammonses completed and submitted the assessor's 
form. (R.0005 at ,I 32; R.0044-0045.) Upon receiving that confirmation, the 
assessor restored the residential exemption to the Hammonses' property. 
(R.0035.) 
The Hammonses took no action after that for almost three years, until fall 
2012, when they sought a refund from the county assessor for the difference 
between the taxes they paid on the full value of their property in 2007 and 2008 
and the lesser amount they would have paid had the assessor applied the 
residential exemption. (R.0006 at ,I 45.) The assessor denied their request 
(R.0046-0048), and the Hammonses appealed that decision to the vVeber County 
Tax Review Committee (R.0006 at 1 47). The committee heard the Hammonses' 
appeal and recommended that the county commission deny their refund request. 
17 
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Before the county commission, the Hammonses argued for the first time 
that in 2007 and 2008 the county was barred from requiring them to provide 
proof of residency because at that time the county had not yet passed an 
ordinance referenced in a separate statute regarding the residential exemption. 
(R.0006 at 1111 49-50.) That statute allowed a county to pass an ordinance 
requiring a residential property owner to first file with the county board of 
equalization a statement certifying that the property was residential and 
containing other information required by the state tax commission before 
receiving the exemption. Utah Code § 59-2-103.5. If a county had not passed such 
an ordinance, the statute provided that the board of equalization could not make 
the statement an eligibility requirement for the exemption and was required to 
allow the exemption in accordance with the residential exemption statute. Id. 
The county commission remanded that new issue for the tax review 
committee to consider. (R.0007 at 11 51.) The committee did, and again 
recommended that the commission deny the Hammonses's refund request, which 
it did. (R.0007 at 1111 52-53.) This suit followed. 
The Course of Proceedings 
This issue has now gone through three levels of review: the county tax 
committee, the county commission, and the district court. None of the three 
reviews have found in the Hammonses' favor. 
18 
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The Hammonses brought their suit against not just the county and the 
county commission, but also against the county commissioners (Jan Zogmaister, 
Kerry Gibson, and Matthew Bell), the county assessor (John Ulibarri), and the 
county clerk/ auditor (Ricky Hatch) in their personal capacities. They alleged ten 
causes of action, ranging from alleged violations of ordinances, negligence, and 
unjust enrichment to fraud. (R.0001-0017.) The district court disposed of the 
case through a series of rulings on three motions made by the defendants 
("County"). 
The district court dismissed several causes of action when it ruled on the 
County's motion to dismiss (R.0166-0171), and entered judgment on the 
pleadings on all but one of the remaining causes of action on the parties' 
subsequent cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. (R.0429-0437.) That 
ruling provides the basis for the Hammonses' appeal. They challenge the district 
court's ruling granting the County judgment on the pleadings on the 
Hammonses' first three causes of action, alleging that (1) denying the exemption 
was illegal, (2) not notifying the Hammonses that they had overpaid was illegal, 
and (3) not applying overpaid taxes to the Hammonses' bill was illegal. (R.0429-
0437; 0007-0011 at ,I,I 57-86.) 
The County thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings on the 
Hammonses' sole remaining claim, for negligence, which the Hammonses did not 
oppose. (R.0446-044 7.) This appeal followed. 
19 
22:!4951 DOCXCJ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Disposition Below 
The district court granted the County judgment on the pleadings on the 
Hammonses' first three causes of action. Regarding their first cause of action, 
asserting that the county acted illegally when it withheld the residential 
exemption on the Hammonses' property until they provided the county assessor 
a statement confirming it was their primary residence, the district court held the 
county assessor's actions were legal. (R.0429-0437.) As for the Hammonses' 
second and third causes of action, respectively alleging that the county illegally 
failed to notify them that they had overpaid their property taxes during the two 
years the county withheld the residential exemption and that it illegally failed to 
apply those overpayments to the Hammonses taxes, the district court held that 
the county was under no obligation to do so because the Hammonses had not 
timely appealed the county's withholding of the residential exemption under 
Utah Code§ 59-2-1004. (R.0429-0437.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL 
1. Appellants Jesse and Alison Hammons m,vn residential property in 
Liberty, Weber County, Utah. ( R.0004 at, 16.) 
2. Although the county had applied the residential exemption found in 
Utah Code § 59-2-103 to the Hammonses' property in prior years, in 2007 and 
2008 the county did not apply the residential exemption to the property, and 
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instead assessed it based on its full fair market value. (R.0004-0005 at ,r,i 20-22, 
30.) 
3. Only after the Hammonses executed a form provided by the assessor 
called a "Signed Statement of Primary Residence; Pursuant to Section: 59-2-103 
and 59-2-307 UCA'' and submitted it to the assessor in 2009 did the county again 
apply the residential exemption to the Hammonses' property. (R.0005 at ,r,r 31-
32, 34; R.0044-0045.) 
4. In 2007 and 2008, Weber County had not enacted the ordinance 
referenced in section 59-2-103.5, requiring in certain circumstances property 
owners to first apply to the board of equalization in order to receive a residential 
exemption. (R.0005 at ,r37; R.0055-0056.) 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The parties differ in their interpretations of the governing property tax 
statutes. The County reads Utah Code § 59-2-103 as requiring the county assessor 
to value residential property· for taxation at its fair market value, unless the 
property qualifies for a residential exemption, which reduces its valuation by 
forty-five percent. A property qualifies for the exemption, however, only if it is 
the ovvner's primary residence. In the County's view, the county assessor is 
authorized to make that determination, and to investigate if it is unclear. To the 
County, the legislature's subsequent adoption of Utah Code § 59-2-103.5 had no 
effect on the county assessor's responsibilities under section 59-2-103. Section 
21 
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59-2-103.5, passed in the wake of this Court's decision in A.E., Inc. v. Summit 
County Comm'n, 2001 UT App 322, 35 P .3d 1153, in which the Court affirmed the 
denial of a residential exemption because the property owner had not applied for 
it under Utah Code § 59-2-1102(3) (2000 ), made the residential exemption 
automatic for qualifying properties unless the county adopted an ordinance 
requiring property 0v\tners to first file a statement with the board of equalization 
affirming their status. That statute did not, however, alter section 59-2-103's 
instruction for county assessors to value residential properties at fair market 
value unless they qualified for the residential exemption. 
Consequently, the county assessor did not act illegally here when, 
concerned that the Hammonses' property might not be their primary residence, 
he vvithheld the residential exemption until they provided him ·with a statement 
confirming that it was. The fact that the county had not passed the ordinance 
referenced in section 59-2-103.5 had no effect on his conduct's legality. 
Because the county assessor's actions were legal, and the Hammonses' 
second and third causes of action rely on a determination that they were not, the 
Court need not reach them if it affirms the district court on this point. 
If the Court does, however, reach the Hammonses' second and third causes 
of action, it should affirm the district court's holding that they fail because the 
Hammonses did not timely appeal the county's \\rithholding of the residential 
exemption as provided under Utah Code§ 59-2-1004. 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly held that the county assessor did not 
violate state law when he withdrew a statutory residential 
exemption for primary residences to the Hamrnonses' property 
until they provided a statement confirming that it was their 
primary residence, regardless whether the county had adopted 
an ordinance that would have allowed its board of equalization 
to require a similar statement before a property owner could 
receive the exemption. (responding to Points I and II of the 
Hammonses' brief, pages 16-27) 
A. County assessors are and were statutorily authorized, and likely 
required, to determine whether a property qualifies for a residential 
exemption. 
County assessors are statutorily required to assess the fair market value of 
private property to determine the amount of property tax to be charged those 
properties, including whether the value for certain residential property should be 
reduced under Utah's residential exemption. Assessors are correspondingly also 
statutorily empowered to investigate whether a property qualifies for the 
residential exemption. 
Utah Code § 59-2-301 6 requires county assessors to "assess all property 
located within the county which is not required by law to be assessed by the [tax] 
commission." Id. By its plain language, therefore, assessors are required, "'rith an 
exception inapplicable here, "to estimate officially the value ... as a basis for 
taxation" of all property within their counties. Webster's Encyclopedic 
6 The statute remains unchanged from the relevant time, so the County uses the 
current version here. 
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Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 125 (Gramercy Books 1996) 
(defining "assess"). 
Utah Code § 59-2-103 ("section 103") required at the relevant time (and 
still requires) that "[a]ll tangible taxable property" "be assessed ... at a uniform 
and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value ... unless otherwise provided 
by law." Utah Code§ 59-2-103(1). In the immediately succeeding subsection, the 
law otherwise provided: the fair market value of residential property was to be 
reduced by forty-five percent, but only for one primary residence per household 
(and "[n]o more than one acre of land per residential unit"). Utah Code § 59-2-
103(2)-(4). 
Because the county assessor is charged with the duty to assess county 
property, and because residential property should be assessed at forty-five 
percent less than fair market value, but only for one primary residence per 
household, the county assessor must determine whether the residential property 
being assessed satisfies the requirements for the residential exemption. See State 
v. Barrett, 127 P.3d 682, 689 (Utah 2005) (explaining that Utah courts "read the 
plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony 
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters" ( citation and 
quotation marks omitted)). 
The Hammonses' argument that assessors were statutorily empowered to 
do nothing more than establish fair market value and verify ownership (R.248-
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250, 0253-0254) imposes too narrow a reading. A fair reading of the governing 
statutes reveals that assessors were charged with assessing properties as the law 
instructed, including applying the residential exemption to only qualifying 
properties. v\lho else would enforce the statutory limitation on the residential 
exemption found in section 103? 
Other sections of the Property Tax Act applicable during the relevant time 
make the county assessor's authority to determine whether a property qualified 
for the residential exemption more explicit. Because county assessors had to (and 
still must) assess residential property at a reduced rate, but only if the property 
qualifies as a primary residence, it follows that county assessors would be 
authorized to investigate whether ·a property qualifies for the exemption. Utah 
Code §§ 59-2-306 and -307 empowered assessors to do just that. Utah Code § 59-
2-306(1) (2000)7 authorized an assessor to "request a signed statement from any 
person setting forth all the real . . . property assessable by the assessor which is 
owned, possessed, managed, or under the control of the person .... " That signed 
statement "shall include" "all property belonging to, claimed by, or in the 
possession, control, or management of the person." Utah Code § 59-2-306(3)(a). 
7 The section was amended in 2008 to add more specific dates and deadlines, but 
the substance relied upon here did not change. The County therefore uses the 
2000 version throughout this brief. 
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The act also authorized assessors to "subpoena and examine any person ... 
in relation to any signed statement." Utah Code § 59-2-306(4). People who 
refused to file the signed statement requested by the assessor, including "with 
respect to name and place of residence," were subject to statutory penalty. Utah 
Code § 59-2-307(1) (2006)8• 
When read together, sections 59-2-306 and 59-2-307 demonstrate the 
assessor's authority to investigate whether a property qualifies for the residential 
exemption as a primary residence. 
Authorizing assessors to make such determinations was also consistent 
with contemporary Utah Administrative Rules, which allowed a property to 
qualify for the residential exemption while under construction "[i]f the county 
assessor determine[d]" that it would qualify when completed. Utah Admin. Code 
§ R884-24P-52(F)(3) (2007)9. They similarly also allowed an unoccupied 
property to qualify "[i]f the county assessor determine[d]" that it would qualify 
once occupied. Utah Ad.min. Code§ R884-24P-52(F)(6). 
The Hammonses' reference to Summit County's current residential 
exemption ordinance (Aplts.' Br. at 20-21) is inapposite to interpreting the law 
8 The section was amended in 2008, but because those amendments are 
immaterial to the issue posed by the Hammonses' appeal, the County refers 
throughout this brief to the 2006 version. 
9 The rule was subsequently amended during the relevant time frame, but the 
cited provisions remained unchanged. 
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applicable to Weber County approximately eight years ago. The County does 
note, however, that even under Summit County's ordinance, property owners are 
required to initially provide evidence that their property qualifies for the 
exemption to the county assessor, and explicitly authorizes the county assessor to 
investigate. (R.0319-0327 at Summit County Ord. 1-12B-1(A) & (D).) 
B. That the county had not adopted an ordinance that would have 
allowed its board of equalization to require a similar statement 
before a property owner could receive the exemption as the county 
assessor required here did not affect the county assessor's 
independent authority. 
The state legislature did not modify county assessors' authority when it 
enacted Utah Code § 59-2-103.5 ("section 103.5"). That section only limited the 
circumstances under which residential property owners had to apply for the 
residential exemption before receiving it. Before section 103.5's enactment, all 
residential property m,vners first had to apply for the exemption to their county 
boards of equalization. After the statute's enactment, property owners no longer 
had to apply for the exemption unless their counties had passed an ordinance 
requiring an application and the property fell within one of three specified 
classifications. Section 103.5 did not alter the exemption's limitation to one 
primary residence per household, nor did it address, and therefore did not 
change, county assessors' statutory authority to investigate whether properties 
qualified for the exemption, including the power to request information related to 
ownership and residency. 
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Section 103.5 required county boards of equalization to allow property 
owners the residential exemption for their qualifying properties vvithout having 
to file an application "on a form prescribed by the [tax] commission" and 
including "information as required by the [tax] commission," unless the county 
had passed an ordinance requiring property owners to apply for the exemption. 
Id. If a county had passed such an ordinance, the application was required if the 
property fell into one of three categories: (1) the property was not eligible for the 
exemption the previous year; (2) the property's ownership had changed; or (3) 
the board of equalization believed the property no longer qualified. Id. 
Before the state legislature enacted section 103.5 in 2002, all property 
owners seeking the residential exemption had to apply for it to their county 
boards of equalization under Utah Code § 59-2-1102(3) (2000) ("No reduction 
may be made in the value of property and no exemption may be granted unless 
the party affected . . . makes and files with the board [ of equalization] a written 
application for the reduction or exemption, .... "), which remains the case for 
some other types of exemptions, see Utah Code § 59-2-1102(3)-(11) (2015). See 
also A.E., Inc. v. Summit County Comm'n, 2001 UT App 322, ,r,r 9-11, 35 P.3d 
1153 (affirming denial of the residential exemption because the property uwner 
had not applied for it under section 59-2-1102(3) (2000)). 
Section 103.5 therefore carved out the residential exemption from section 
59-2-1102's requirement that property owners first had to apply for an exemption 
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to the board of equalization. Instead, section 103.5 (passed the year following 
A.E.) required counties to pass an ordinance if they wished to continue that 
application requirement. The ordinance would require property owners to 
provide their local boards of equalization a statement meeting certain criteria in 
order to "be allowed a residential exemption," Utah Code § 59-2-103.5, but 
otherwise prohibited boards of equalization from requiring one. Section 103.5, 
however, did not abrogate section 103's limitation on residential exemptions to 
one primary residence per household. In other words, just because a county had 
not adopted an ordinance requiring property owners to apply for the residential 
exemption did not mean that every residential property within that county 
automatically received the exemption, regardless whether it was a primary 
residence as required by section 103(4)(a). 
Section 103.5 repeatedly and explicitly reiterated that it was subordinate to 
section 103. It enjoined boards of equalization to allow the residential exemption 
in counties without ordinances requiring applications "in accordance vdth 
Section 59-2-103" (i.e., still limited to primary residences). Utah Code § 59-2-
103.5(3)(b ). 
The interplay between sections 103, 103.5, 59-2-301, 59-2-306, and 59-2-
307, read harmoniously as they must, described a system in which, unless a 
county passed an ordinance requiring otherwise, property ovvners no longer had 
to apply to the board of equalization for the residential exemption. Instead, their 
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residential properties would automatically receive the exemption, so long as they 
qualified. The county assessor assessed qualifying properties (i.e., properties that 
served as a household's primary residence) at fifty-five percent of their fair 
market values (i.e., applying a forty-five percent reduction). If the assessor was 
unsure about a property's status, the assessor could investigate, including seeking 
a signed statement and even exercising subpoena power to examine the property 
owner. And if the assessor did not apply the exemption, the property owner could 
challenge that decision by appealing to the board of equalization under Utah 
Code § 59-2-1004(1)(a) ("A taxpayer dissatisfied with the valuation or the 
equalization of the taxpayer's real property may make an application to appeal .. 
.. "). 
Because section 103.5 did not modify the county assessor's obligation to 
apply the residential exemption only to qualifying properties or his authority to 
investigate whether a property qualified for the exemption, his investigation 
whether the Hammonses' property was their primary residence, particularly by 
requesting a signed statement confirming as much under his section 59-2-307 
authority (the section the assessor's own form cited (R.0005 at ,r,i31-32, 34; 
Roo44-0045))10, remained legal. 
10 As opposed to using "a form prescribed by the [tax] commission." Utah Code§ 
59-2-103.5. The current version of that form, "Application for Residential 
Property Exemption (UC 59-2-103 and 59-2-10[3].5)," can be found at 
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The Hammonses, however and in contrast to the County's harmonizing 
approach, view section 103.5 as an unrestricted tax break for all residential 
property that prohibited counties from even inquiring whether a property was a 
primary residence unless they passed an ordinance that allowed their boards of 
equalization to ask for the statement the statute described ( under limited 
circumstances). That reading ignores section 103.5's historical context and would 
render section 103's primary residence restriction inoperative. 
That the Hammonses' interpretation would render the primary residence 
limitation inoperative becomes clear when considering a hypothetical residential 
property that is not the owners' primary reside:r;ice. If the county in which that 
property is situated did not pass an ordinance requiring a statement under 
section 103.5, the Hammonses' view would mean that the property owners would 
nonetheless automatically receive the exemption. But because the county 
assessor could not, according to the Hammonses, request information from the 
property o,vners to confirm that the property is their primary residence or 
"Withhold the exemption, the limitation restricting the exemption to one primary 
residence per household would be inoperative because no one could enforce or 
apply it. In fact, under the Hammonses' approach, in that situation a property 
ovvner could own tvvo side-by-side residences and the assessor would have no 
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choice but to value each applying the forty-five percent reduction under the 
residential exemption. The restriction would be meaningless under that 
interpretation. 
The Hammonses have argued that the assessor should, in that situation, 
raise any suspicion that the property does not qualify for the exemption \.\rith the 
board of equalization. (R.251.) Setting aside whether the assessor would even 
suspect the hypothetical property did not qualify, approaching the board would 
be unavailing because, under the Hammonses' interpretation, the board could do 
nothing. Subsection 103.5(3) would require the board to, absent the ordinance 
referenced in section 103.5 requiring a statement, allow the exemption. 11 
Because Utah law requires courts to "give effect to every provision of a 
statute and avoid an interpretation that will render portions of a statute 
inoperative," Thayer v. Washington County School District, 2012 UT 31, ,I 12, 
285 P.3d 1142 (quotation marks and citation omitted), the County's 
interpretation should be endorsed and the Hammonses' rejected. 
Under the circumstances alleged in this case, the county assessor was not 
limited by section 103.5 from withholding the Hammonses' residential exemption 
until they provided a statement confirming that their property was their primary 
11 That would be true even if the assessor knew that the property was not a 
primary residence. But under the County's interpretation, where section 103.5 
succeeded section 59-2-1102's application process, a board of equalization could 
still, as an appellate body, review a county assessor's decision applying or denying 
a residential exemption under Utah Code § 59-2-1004. 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
residence, even though the county had not passed the ordinance referenced in 
section 103.5 that would have allowed the board of equalization to require a 
similar statement before allowing the exemption in the first instance under 
certain circumstances. 
II. Should the Court affirm that the county assessor acted within 
his authority, it does not need to decide if, upon receiving the 
Hammonses' statement that the property had been their 
primary residence during the years the assessor withheld the 
exemption, the county must have notified them that they had 
overpaid and applied those alleged overpayments toward their 
taxes because the Hammonses' claims presume that the county 
assessor lacked the authority to withhold the exemption. 
(responding to Point III of the Hammonses' brief, pages 28-30) 
In their complaint, the Hammonses based the three claims at issue-that 
(1) denying the exemption was illegal, (2) not notifying them that they had 
overpaid was illegal, and (3) not applying overpaid taxes to those owed in the 
current year was illegal (R.0007-0011 at ,r,r 57-86)-on their theory that the 
county could not deny them the residential exemption if it had not passed the 
ordinance authorized by section 103.5. (R.0008 at ,r,r 63-64 (alleging in their first 
cause of action that the county "had no statutory authority" to deny the 
Hammonses the exemption because it had not passed the ordinance), R.0008-
0009 at ,i,r 68-69, 71-74 (asserting that, because the county lacked authority to 
vVithhold the exemption without the ordinance, the Hammonses' full payments 
were actually overpayments of which the county was legally bound to notify 
them), R.0010 at ,r,r 78-84 (similarly contending that without the ordinance the 
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county could not withhold the exemption, meaning that the Hammonses 
overpaid and that they should have received a tax credit for their overpayments).) 
The County noted this fact in its briefing on its motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. It argued that, if the district court agreed that the lack of the ordinance 
authorized by section 103.5 did not diminish the county assessor,s authority to 
withhold the Hammonses' residential exemption until he received a written 
statement that the home was a primary residence, that conclusion would prove 
fatal to the Hammonses' first, second, and third causes of action (among others). 
(R.215-217.) The Hammonses agreed, stating in their opposition memorandum 
that "Plaintiffs agree that causes of action 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 all rely on the Court's 
interpretation of §59-2-103 and §59-2-103.5 and related sections of the Utah 
Code." (R. 248.) 
At the hearing on the County's motion, however, the Hammonses' counsel 
attempted to withdraw their concession, first stating that the county assessor's 
authority was a "major question," but that he was "not sure that" deciding the 
question "resolves all the issues." (R.0465/51:10-23.) By the end of the hearing, 
when the district court expressed doubt that holding that the county assessor 
indeed had the authority to withhold the exemption and entering judgment on 
the pleadings for the County on the Hammonses' first cause of action would also 
resolve their second and third causes of action (R.0465/83:24-84:23), the 
Hammonses' counsel, contradicting the concession in their briefing, agreed that 
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such a holding would not resolve their second and third causes of action 
(R.0465/85:25-86:24). The district court ended the hearing by noting that it 
would reexamine the complaint and briefing to determine whether deciding the 
assessor's authority would also resolve the Hammonses' second and third causes 
of action. (R.0465/87:9-21.) 
The district court's order, however, did not expressly address that issue. 
The court held that the county assessor did not illegally withhold the 
Hammonses' exemption and entered the requested judgment on their first cause 
of action. (R.0429-0432.) As to the Hammonses' second and third causes of 
action, the court ruled in the County's favor based on the Hammonses' failure to 
timely appeal their valuation. (R.0432-0434.) The Hammonses now challenge 
the district court's conclusions (Aplts.' Br. at 28-31), but the Court need not reach 
their argument based on the alternative ground argued (and conceded by the 
Hammonses) below-that the Hammonses' second and third causes of action 
hinged on their assertion that vvithholding the exemption was illegal because the 
county had not passed the ordinance authorized by section 103.5. 
"[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though 
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of 
its ruling or action, .... "' State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 1 9, 76 P.3d 1159 
(quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ,I 10, 52 P.3d 1158) (quotation marks and 
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citations omitted). The County's argument that the Court need not reach the 
question whether the Hammonses' timely challenged the county assessor's 
withdrawal of the exemption under the appropriate statute is apparent on the 
record because it was briefed below and addressed at the 26 August 2015 hearing. 
Because the order the Hammonses appealed from was on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, the district court was, as this Court is now, limited to 
reviewing the pleadings as they were alleged. West, 2006 UT App 22, ,i 4 
(limiting review of a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings to a 
determination whether the plaintiff could recover under the alleged facts). In 
Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court 
refused to address the plaintiff and appellant's argument-expressed in both her 
briefing on the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings12 and argument 
before the trial court-that the defendant university's employee may have struck 
her unintentionally, thereby potentially avoiding its governmental immunity 
defense for an intentional assault or battery. This Court did not reach the issue, 
though, because it determined that her "argument on this point cannot be 
squared with the allegations in her complaint." Id. at 384. 
12 The Court determined that the motion was properly characterized as to dismiss 
rather than for judgment on the pleadings because the defendants had not yet 
answered when they filed it. Id. at 382-83. But the standard of review is the same. 
West, 2006 UT App 222, ,r 4. 
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Noting that the appellant alleged that the employee "assaulted and struck 
her," not that the employee "unintentionally struck her," the Court explained 
that, "[a]lthough we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and affirm 
dismissal only if no set of facts exists to support the complaint, we cannot add 
facts or causes of action to the complaint that do not exist and that [the plaintiff] 
has consistently declined to include." Id. (quotation marks and emphasis 
omitted). 
As alleged, both the Hammonses' second and third causes of action relied 
upon a threshold conclusion that the county assessor lacked the authority to 
withhold the residential exemption absent the ordinance authorized by section 
103.5. Consequently, the district court, having decided that the county assessor's 
decision to withhold the exemption from the Hammonses was legal, did not need 
to engage in its analysis about whether the Hammonses timely raised those 
claims under the appropriate statute. If this Court affirms on that point, then it 
similarly need not conduct that review. 
The Hammonses' explicit concession in their briefing on the County's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings that resolving the county assessor's 
authority to withhold the exemption would also resolve their second and third 
causes of action, moreover, equitably estopped them from asserting otherwise 
before the trial court and before this Court. The Hammonses' statement satisfies 
the doctrine's three elements: first, they made a statement or admission (that 
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resolving the county assessor's authority would also resolve their second and 
third causes of action) that was inconsistent with a subsequent claim (that it 
would not); second, the County reasonably relied on that statement or admission 
by not independently addressing those causes of action by employing distinct 
defensive arguments; and third, the County would potentially be injured if the 
Hammonses' repudiation is allowed to stand and this Court finds its arguments 
against their second and third causes of action unpersuasive. See Youngblood v. 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ,r 14, 158 P.3d 1088 (listing the elements for 
equitable estoppel). 
Regardless whether the Hammonses' retraction rises to the level of 
equitable estoppel, their complaint's plain language founded their second and 
third causes of action on a threshold determination that the county assessor's 
withdrawal of the residential exemption was illegal because the county had not 
passed the ordinance authorized by section 103.5. Because the county assessor's 
withdrawal was legal, the Court therefore need not reach the district court's 
analysis of those causes of action. Indeed, on appeal the Hammonses continue to 
assume a threshold determination that the county assessor acted illegally when 
making their argument that their claims fell under section 1321, rather than 
section 1004. (Aplts.' Br. at 29 (asserting that section 1321 applies because the 
county assessor's illegal withdrawal of the exemption resulted in overpaid taxes).) 
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III. Alternatively, the district court correctly held that, upon 
receiving the Hammonses' statement that the property at issue 
had been their primary residence during the years the assessor 
'Withheld the exemption, the county was not required to have 
notified them that they had overpaid their property taxes and to 
have applied those alleged overpayments toward their current 
tax obligations because the Hammonses did not timely appeal 
the county's allegedly erroneous valuation under Utah Code § 
59-2-1004. (responding to Point III of the Hammonses' brief, pages 28-
30) 
The Hammonses argue that their second and third causes of action 
(asserting that the County illegally failed to notify them that they had overpaid 
their taxes during the years the county assessor withheld the residential 
exemption and illegally refused to apply those overpayments as a credit against 
their current taxes (R.0008-0011 at~~ 67-86)) are properly brought under Utah 
Code § 59-2-1321 ("section 1321"), not Utah Code § 59-2-1004 ("section 1004"), 
as the district court held. Their desire to place them under the former as opposed 
to the latter is understandable. Under section 1321 they can bring an action in 
district court after presenting their claim to the county commission. But under 
section 1004, they must follow an administrative process under tight time 
constraints with which they did not comply and that would result in lost claims. 
The Hammonses' claims of overpayment, however, are not readily apparent from 
county records as required for a section 1321 claim, and fall ,,vi.thin the valuation 
challenge addressed by section 1004. 
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"The legislative scheme clearly contemplates that the primary vehicle for 
challenging property tax assessments is the administrative appeals process laid 
out in section 59-2-1004." Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 2003 
UT 28, ~ 14, 73 P.3d 362. Under section 1004, "[a] taxpayer dissatisfied with the 
valuation or the equalization of the taxpayer's real property may make an 
application to appeal by" applying to the board of equalization within the later of 
September 15 of the current calendar year or forty-five days after the county 
auditor mails the assessment notice, unless otherwise provided. Utah Code § 59-
2-1004(1)(a) & (2). 
Section 1321, in contrast, has a "relatively narrow" scope. Tt1'oodbury, 2003 
UT 28, 1 9. It provides that "[t]he county legislative body, upon sufficient 
evidence being produced that property has been either erroneously or illegally 
assessed, may order the county treasurer to" either refund or deduct the taxes 
collected or to be collected on the property. Utah Code § 59-2-1321. Section 1321 
addresses only situations where "'it is clear the county had no authority to collect, 
and, in case [the taxes] are collected, has no legal right to retain them'"; the 
illegality "'is absolutely assumed."' Woodbury, 2003 UT 28, ,r 11 (quoting Neilson 
v. Sanpete County, 123 P. 334, 338 (Utah 1912)). "[T]o receive a refund under 
section 59-2-1321 ... the taxpayer must be able to point to a specific ... error or 
illegality that is readily apparent from county records. If the illegality is in 
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dispute, the taxpayer must first pay under protest before he has standing to 
challenge the tax in court under section 59-2-1327." Id., ,r 12. 
In other words, "in the limited circumstance where a taxpayer can point to 
an error of fact or law in the collection of the tax, or a payment more than once, 
that is readily apparent from county records, he may apply to the commission to 
refund the mistakenly collected amount under Utah Code section 59-2-1321, ... 
. " Id., ,I 15. Otherwise, the taxpayer must either work through the section 1004 
process or, if the taxpayer waives that recourse, pay under protest and bring an 
action under Utah Code § 59-2-1327. 
In I-1'oodbury, the supreme court even quoted favorably from a New York 
decision where the court rejected the taxpayer's refund request based on his 
assertion "that he had erroneously paid taxes according to the assessment that 
included the property belonging to another." Id., ,I 18. The New York court held 
that the taxpayer had to seek correction through the standard statutory scheme 
because the over-assessment was the assessors' error and only evident based on 
extrinsic facts. Id. 
The overpayments the Hammonses allege here similarly do not rise to the 
obviousness required for a section 1321 action. The Hammonses allege no facts 
that show that the county's assessment was clearly erroneous as readily apparent 
from the county's records. 
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Even assuming that the Hammonses based their second and third causes of 
action on an allegation that the county erroneously categorized their property as 
not a primary residence (although, as the foregoing shows, the Hammonses 
instead actually based their claims on their theory that the county assessor lacked 
the authority to withhold the exemption), that was not readily apparent from the 
county records when the county assessed their property in 2007 and 2008. 
The Hammonses allege that they called someone at the county about the 
issue in 2007 (R.0005 at ,r 28; R.0463/24:11-25:9), submitted an address change 
to someone at the county at some point in 2008 (R.0005 at ,r 27), and that they 
indicated in a hand-written note on the form they submitted to the county 
assessor in 2009 that the property had been their primary residence since 2005 
(R.0005 at 11 32, R.0044-0045). But a phone call asldng about an assessment, a 
change of address, or even a statement confirming a home is a primary residence 
on which appears a handvvritten note that the home had been the homeowner's 
primary residence since 2005 are not the kinds of facts that would have made the 
county's supposed error clear on its own contemporaneous records. For each, the 
county would have had to undertaken some sort of investigation to discover the 
argued error. (At best, the Hammonses' statement confirming the property was 
their primary residence-what their attorney called the best evidence of the 
county's purported error (R.0465/36:19-37:15)-merely informed it of what the 
trial court correctly termed "two potentially erroneous assessments'' (R.0433).) 
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Section 1321 is not so broad. If it were, it would greatly increase the county's 
workload to include monitoring and investigating every communication from a 
third party that could affect its tax liability, and would therefore expose the 
county to significant increased risk. 
The proper mechanism to challenge the withheld exemptions here, 
however, was section 1004. That section allows taxpayers to appeal their 
valuations or equalizations to the board of equalization. Utah Code § 59-2-
1004(1)(a). vVhen the county assessor ½ithheld the residential exemption from 
the Hammonses' property, the result was that their property was assessed at full 
value, rather than forty-five percent less than full value (the amount of the 
household exemption). The Hammonses' alleged overpayment, then, resulted 
from an erroneous valuation. Section 1004 is therefore specifically written to 
address the Hammonses' claims, of which there is no doubt that they received 
notice (R.0033 (showing the appeal notice on their tax forms)). 
The Hammonses do not allege that they followed that procedure, nor do 
they dispute the district court's finding that their statement would have been too 
late if it were (generously) considered an appeal under section 1004. (R.0429-
0437.) The Hammonses also do not allege that they made the payments under 
protest, which would have qualified them for an action under section 59-2-1327 
upon waiving their section 1004 review opportunity. They cannot avoid the 
consequences of their failure to follow that process, or of even simply paying their 
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taxes under protest, by attempting to shoehorn what is at its essence a valuation 
claim into the clear error required for a section 1321 action. 
The district court, although getting there using a different approach, came 
to the correct conclusion that the Hammonses' second and third causes of action 
did not sound under section 1321, but instead under section 1004. The Woodbury 
court's quotation from Cooley on Taxation is particularly applicable here and 
reflects the district court's concern: 
"To accord a right of recovery in every case where, after assessments 
have been made without appeal, budgets and tax rules predicated 
thereon, the taxes paid without objection or protest, and the monies 
expended for the public purposes, it afterwards develops that some 
mistake has been made in the assessment, would work disastrous 
results. It must of necessity be confined to extreme and exceptional 
cases." 
Woodbury, 2003 UT 28, ,r 17 (quoting 3 Cooley on Taxation, 1295, 4th ed. 
(1924)). 
The Hammonses had the opportunity to, under section 1004, appeal the 
county assessor's valuation of their property at full value, rather than at forty-five 
percent less as it would have been if the county assessor had applied the 
residential exemption. The tax bill they received explained how they could have 
brought that appeal. They did not, however, take advantage of that process. Nor 
did they pay their taxes on the full value of their property under protest. 
Accordingly, the Harnmonses waived their challenge. They cannot reinstate it 
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now under section 1321 or the county's ordinances implementing it. '\,V eber Co. 
Ord. §§ 6-14-1 et seq. (1985)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the County requests the Court affirm the district 
court's entry of judgment on the pleadings on the Hammonses' first, second, and 
third causes of action. The county assessor acted legally when he withheld the 
residential exemption from the Hammonses' property until they provided a 
statement confirming it was their primary residence, even though the county had 
not passed the ordinance authorized by section 103.5. That section allowed 
residents to benefit from the residential exemption without having to apply for it 
unless the county passed the ordinance it references. But section 103.5 in no way 
altered the county assessor's authority to value property, including assurmg 
property qualified for the value reduction the exemption allowed. 
Because the Hammonses' claims at issue on appeal aU presume that the 
county assessor lacked the authority to ,..vithhold the Hammonses' residential 
exemption until they provided a statement confirming the property was their 
primary residence, a decision affirming the district court's determination makes 
resolving the Hammonses' claims that the county was obliged to notify them of 
overpayments and apply the alleged overpayments to their taxes unnecessary. 
In the event the Court nonetheless reaches those issues, the district court's 
ultimate conclusion that the Hammonses could not pursue the claims because 
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they failed to file timely appeals under section 1004 should be affirmed. That 
statute, not section 1321, provided the procedure for them to seek a remedy. 
DATE: 12 August 2016. 
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~ c,..b 11- l(A,.,.., -,:l---
Barton H. Kunz II \ 
Bryson R. Brown 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/ Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
In compliance with the type-volume limitation of Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(f)(1), I certify that this brief contains 8,968 words, excluding the 
table of contents, table of authorities, and addendum. In compliance with the 
typeface requirements of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(b ), I certify that 
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced font using Microsoft 




~4 tklM7"-L_ Barton H. Kunz I \ 
Attorney for 
Defendants/ Appellees 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12 August 2016, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing brief of appellees Weber County, Weber County Commission, Jan 
Zogmaister, Kerry Gibson, Matthew Bell, John Ulibarri, and Ricky Hatch were 
served upon the follo'Wing by first class, postage prepaid U.S. mail: 
Scott L.Hansen,scottlhansen@gmail.com 
T.R. Morgan, trmorgan@echardlaw.com 
SCOTT L. HANSEN PLLC 
T.R. MORGAN PC 
2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 201 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
47 
2204951.DOCXCJ 
"'S5 ~ IA lew.., ~ 
Ilarton H. Kunz II} 
Attorney for 
Defendants/ Appellees 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A21 
House Bill 305 - Enrolled 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10/12/2016 HB0305 
H.B. 305 Enrolled 
PROPERTY TAX AMENDMENTS 
2002 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor: Wayne A. Harper 
This act amends the Property Tax Act to address when applications, statements, or other 
filings are required for an exemption from taxation or a reduction in value. This act makes 
technical changes. The act takes effect on January 1, 2003, and provides for retrospective 
operation under certain circumstances. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
59-2-1101, as last amended by Chapters 221 and 310, Laws of Utah 2001 
59-2-1102, as last amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 2000 
ENACTS: 
59-2-103.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 59-2-103.5 is enacted to read: 
5~2-103.5. Procedures to obtain an exemption for residential property. 
(1) Subiect to the other provisions of this section a county legislative body may by 
ordinance require that in order for residential property to be allowed a residential exemption in 
accordance with Section 59-2-103, an owner of the residential property shall file with the county 
board of equalization a statement: 
(a) on a form prescribed by the commission by rule· 
fb) signed bv all of the owners of the residential property· 
(cJ certifying that the residential property is residential property: and 
fdJ containing other information as required by the commission by rule. 
/2) /al Subiect to Section 59-2-103 and except as provided in Subsection (3). a county 
board of equalization shall allow an owner described in Subsection (1) a residential exemption for 
the residential property described in Subsection (1) if.' 
m the county legislative body enacts the ordinance described in Subsection (1): and 
fii/ the county board of equalization determines that the requirements of Subsection (1) are 
met. 
fbJ A county board of equalization may require an owner of the residential property 
described in Subsection (1 J to file the statement described in Subsection /1) only if' 
m that residential property was ineligible for the residential exemption authorized under 
Section 59-2-103 during the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year for which the 
owner is seeking to claim the residential exemption for that residential property: 
fiiJ an ownership interest in that residential property changes· or 
fiii) the county board of equalization determines that there is reason to believe that that 
residential property no longer qualifies for the residential exemption in accordance with Section 
59-2-103. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a). if a county legislative body does not enact an 
ordinance requiring an owner to file a statement in accordance with this section the county board 
of equalization: 
(aJ may not require an owner to file a statement for residential property to be eligible for a 
residential exemption in accordance with Section 59-2-103 · and 
(b) shall allow a residential exemption for residential property in accordance with Section 
59-2-103. 
(4J fa) In accordance with Title 63 Chapter 46a Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. the 
commission shall make rules providinq-
m the form for the statement described in Subsection f1J" and 
fiil the contents of the form for the statement described in Subsection (1 J. 
(bl The commission shall make the form described in Subsection (4)(aJ available to counties. 
Section 2. Section 59-2-1101 is amended to read: 
59-2-1101. Exemption of certain property -- Proportional payments for 
government-owned property -- County legislative body authority to adopt rules or ordinances. 
(1) ~ [=FAe] Except as provided in Subsection (1JCbJ the exemptions, deferrals, and 
abatements authorized by this part may be allowed only if the claimant is the owner of the property 
-2-
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as of January 1 of the year the exemption is claimed[~L. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(a) it the claimant is a federal, state, or political 
subdivision entity under Subsection (2)(a}, (b), or (c), [iA whieh ease] the entity shall collect and pay 
a proportional tax based upon the length of time that the property was not owned by the entity. 
(2) The following property is exempt from taxation: 
(a} property exempt under the laws of the United States; 
(b) property of the state, school districts, and public libraries; 
(c) property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all other political subdivisions 
of the state, except as provided in Title 11, Chapter 13, lnterlocal Cooperation Act; 
(d) property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for religious, charitable, 
or educational purposes; 
(e) places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; 
(f) farm equipment and machinery; and 
(g) intangible property. 
H3) ~a) The e .. Aer .. t:ie Feeei. es e~<eFnf3t stet1:1s fer 1=1re19er1), if re1:11:1irea b~ the eeFnFnissieA, 
shell file a sigAea steteFneAt, eA er 19efere Merel:! 1 eeet:i) ear, eertif) iAg the 1:1se te .. Rich the f3FBl'=)CR') 
t:ies beeri l'=)leeed d1:1Firig tt:ie !=)est) ear. Tt:ie sigAed steteFneAt st:iall eeAteiA tt:ie felleoiAg iRf:erFnetieFI 
iFI 9l:IFnFnBF) feFFn:] 
W) ideAti~ ef the iAai. idual .. Re signed the steteFnent;] 
[M the basis ef tl:le sigAer's lcAenledge ef the 1:1se ef the 1=1re19ert) ;] 
Wii) e1:1therit; te Fnelte tl=te sigried steteFneAt eA bet:ielf ef tl=te e.·,Aer;] 
W.) eeurit) .. here 19re19er1) is leeeted; BAB] 
[(.) Aature ef 1:1se efthe 19re19ert;,.] 
He) If the sigAeel steteFneAt is Aet :fileel nitl"liA tl"le tiFne liFnits 19reseribeel B) tt;e eo1:1At), tl:le 
e)tefflf3t stet1:1s Fna~. after rietiee BAB t:ieeriAg, be re.elceel eriel tt:ie 19re19eFey then 1:>laeea eri the t~< 
~] 
[f4t-Ttte) {JU county legislative body may adopt rules or ordinances to: 
(a) effectuate the exemptions, deferrals, abatements, or other relief from taxation provided 
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in this part; and 
(b) designate one or more persons to perform the functions given the county under this part. 
Section 3. Section 59-2-1102 is amended to read: 
59-2-1102. Determination of exemptions by board of equalization -- Appeal-· 
Application for exemption•· Annual statement-- Exceptions. 
( 1) f.§1. [=l=Ae) For property assessed under Part 3 County Assessment. the county board of 
equalization may, after giving notice in a manner prescribed by rule, determine whether certain 
property within the county is exempt from taxation. 
{.Q.1. The decision of the county board of equalizationdescribed in Subsection (1}(a) shall~ 
{il be in writing~ and [SMH] 
flil include~ 
~ a statement of facts~ and 
{.fil_ the statutory basis for its decision. 
f..ill A copy of the decision described in Subsection (1)/a) shall be sent on or before May 15 
to the person or organization applying for the exemption. 
(2) The county board of equalization shall notify anowner ot exempt property [ewAeF] [WAS] 
that has previously received an exemption but failed to file [the] an annual statement [as Feei1:1ireel 
1:1Aeler Seeti oA 60 2 1191 ] in accordance with Subsection (9) fc J of the [eeet=Ef!s] county board of 
equalization's intent to revoke the exemption on or before April 1. 
(3) f.fl1. [-Ne] Except as provided in Subsection (8} and subiect to Subsection (9) a reduction 
may not be made under this part in the value of property and [fle] an exemption may not be granted 
under this part unless the party affected or the party's agent 
{il makes and files with the county board of equalization a written application for the 
reduction or exemption. verified by signed statement[-;-L and 
@ appears before the county board of equa/izationand shows facts upon which it is claimed 
the reduction should be made, or exemption granted. [=l=Ae] 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (9) the countvboard of equalization may waive~ 
{il the application or personal appearance requirements of Subsection (3)(a) f 4)(b). or (9)(a): 
-4-
QI. 
(ii) the annual statement requirements of Subsection f9)(c}. 
(4) f.fll Before the county board of equalizationgrants any application for exemption or 
reduction, [+t] the county board of equalization may examine on oath the person or agent making the 
application. [-Ne] 
Cb/ Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b). areduction may not be made or exemption 
granted unless the person or the agent making the application attends and answers all questions 
pertinent to the inquiry. 
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{5} Upon the hearinQ of the application the ~ard of equalization may subpoena any 
witnesses, and hear and take any evidence in relation to the pending[~] application. 
(6) The county board of equalization shall hold hearings and render a written decision to 
determine any exemption on or before May 1 in each year. 
{7} Any property owner dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of equalization 
regarding any reduction or exemption may appeal to the commission under Section 59-2-1006. 
(BJ Notwithstanding Subsection f3}(aJ a county board of equalization may not require an 
owner of property to file an application in accordance with this section in order to claim an 
exemption for the property under the following: 
fa) Subsections 59-2-1101 fWa) through fc>· 
fb) Subsection 59-2-1101 fW0 or fg)· 
fc) Section 59-2-1110 · 
fdJ Section 59-2-1111 · 
feJ Section 59-2-1112 · 
fO Section 59-2-1113 · or 
fqJ Section 59-2-1114. 
f9J faJ Except as provided in Subsections f3)(b) and f9)(bJ for property described in 
Subsection 59-2-1101 f2J(dJ or fe) a county board of equalization shall require an owner of that 
property to file an application in accordance with this section in order to claim an exemption for that 
property. 
- 5-
fb) Notwithstanding Subsection f9)(a) a county board of equalization may not require an 
owner of property described in Subsection 59-2-1101(2)(d) or (e) to file an application under 
Subsection (9)/a) if." 
(i) fAJ the owner filed an application under Subsection (9)fa)· or 
fB) the county board of equalization waived the application requirements in accordance with 
Subsection (3)(b) · 
on the county board of equalization determines that the owner may claim an exemption for 
that property· and 
fiii) the exemption described in Subsection f9)(b)(ii) is in effect. 
(cJ (i) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b) for the time period that an owner is granted 
an exemption in accordance with this section for property described in Subsection 59-2-1101 (2){dJ 
or (el a county board of equalization shall require the owner to file an annual statement on a form 
prescribed by the commission establishing that the property continues to be eligible for the 
exemption. 
on In accordance with Title 63 Chapter 46a Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. the 
commission shall make rules providing: 
(A) the form for the annual statement required by Subsection f9)(cJ(i)· 
(B) the contents of the form for the annual statement required by Subsection (9)(c)(i): and 
(CJ procedures and requirements for making the annual statement required by Subsection 
ffil1f1& 
(iii) The commission shall make the form described in Subsection (9)(c)fii)(A) available to 
counties. 
Section 4. Effective date -- Retrospective operation. 
(1) Subiect to Subsection (2) this act takes effect on January 1 2003. 
(2) Sections 59-2-103. 5 and 59-2-1102 have retrospective operation for an action or appeal 
for which a court of competent iurisdiction. the State Tax Commission or a county board of 
equalization has not issued a final unappeafable iudqment or order if the retrospective operation of 
Sections 59-2-103.5 and 59-2-1102 does not enlarge eliminate. or destroy a vested right. 
-6-
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S.B. 120 Enrolled 
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION 
2004 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor: David L. Thomas 
Howard A. Stephenson 
LONG TITLE 
General Description: 




. grants rulemaking authority to the Utah State Tax Commission; 
. provides that the residential property tax exemption is limited to one primary 
residence per household; 
. addresses the application of the residential property tax exemption with respect to an 
owner of multiple residential properties located within the state; and 
. makes technical changes. 
Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
None 
Other Special Clauses: 
This bill takes effect on January 1, 2005. 
Utah Code Sections Affected: 
AMENDS: 
59-2-102, as last amended by Chapter 113, Laws of Utah 2003 
59-2-103, as last amended by Chapter 275, Laws of Utah 1995 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 59-2-102 is amended to read: 
59-2-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter and title: 
(1) "Aerial applicator" means aircraft or rotorcraft used exclusively for the purpose of 
engaging in dispensing activities directly affecting agriculture or horticulture with an airworthiness 
certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration certifying the aircraft or rotorcraft's use for 
agricultural and pest control purposes. 
(2) "Air charter service" means an air carrier operation which requires the customer to 
hire an entire aircraft rather than book passage in whatever capacity is available on a scheduled 
trip. 
(3) "Air contract service" means an air carrier operation available only to customers who 
engage the services of the carrier through a contractual agreement and excess capacity on any trip 
and is not available to the public at large. 
(4) "Aircraft" is as defined in Section 72-10-102. 
(5) "Airline" means any air carrier operating interstate routes on a scheduled basis which 
offers to fly passengers or cargo on the basis of available capacity on regularly scheduled routes. 
(6) "Assessment roll" means a permanent record of the assessment of property as 
assessed by the county assessor and the commission and may be maintained manually or as a 
computerized file as a consolidated record or as multiple records by type, classification, or 
categories. 
(7) "Certified revenue levy" means a property tax levy that provides the same amount of 
ad valorem property tax revenue as was collected for the prior year, plus new growth, but 
exclusive of revenue from collections from redemptions, interest, and penalties. 
(8) "County-assessed commercial vehicle" means: 
{a) any commercial vehicle, trailer. or semitrailer which is not apportioned under Section 
41-1a-301 and is not operated interstate to transport the v_ehicle owner's goods or property in 
furtherance of the owner's commercial enterprise; 
(b) any passenger vehicle owned by a business and used by its employees for 
transportation as a company car or vanpool vehicle; and 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(c) vehicles which are: 
(i) especially constructed for towing or wrecking, and which are not otherwise used to 
transport goods, merchandise, or people for compensation; 
(ii) used or licensed as taxicabs or limousines; 
(iii) used as rental passenger cars, travel trailers, or motor homes; 
{iv) used or licensed in this state for use as ambulances or hearses; 
(v) especially designed and used for garbage and rubbish collection; or 
(vi) used exclusively to transport students or their instructors to or from any private. 
public, or religious school or school activities. 
(9) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (9)(b), for purposes of Section 59-2-801 , 
"designated tax area" means a tax area created by the overlapping boundaries of only the 
following taxing entities: 
{i) a county; and 
{ii) a school district. 
{b) Notwithstanding Subsection {9)(a), "designated tax area" includes a tax area created 
by the overlapping boundaries of: 
(i) the taxing entities described in Subsection {9)(a); and 
(ii) (A) a city or town if the boundaries of the school district under Subsection {9)(a) and 
the boundaries of the city or town are identical; or 
(B) a special service district if the boundaries of the school district under Subsection 
(9)(a) are located entirely within the special service district. 
(10) "Eligible judgment" means a final and unappealable judgment or order under Section 
59-2-1330: 
(a) that became a final and unappealable judgment or order no more than 14 months prior 
to the day on which the notice required by Subsection59-2-919 (4) is required to be mailed; and 
(b) for which a taxing entity's share of the final and unappealable judgment or order is 
greater than or equal to the lesser of: 
(i) $5,000; or 
-3-
{ii) 2.5% of the total ad valorem property taxes collected by the taxing entity in the 
previous fiscal year. 
{11) (a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land, or any 
improvements to the property, subject to taxation and is: 
(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed to 
the wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority; 
(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure of the taxpayer to 
comply with the reporting requirements of this chapter: or 
{iii) undervalued because of errors made by the assessing authority based upon incomplete 
or erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer. 
{b) Property which is undervalued because of the use of a different valuation 
methodology or because of a different application of the same valuation methodology is not 
"escaped property." 
(12) "Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and 
both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of taxation, "fair market 
value" shall be determined using the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, 
except in cases where there is a reasonable probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting 
that property in the tax year in question and the change would have an appreciable influence upon 
the value. 
(13) "Farm machinery and equipment." for purposes of the exemption provided under 
Section 59-2-1101 , means tractors. milking equipment and storage and cooling facilities, feed 
handling equipment, irrigation equipment, harvesters, choppers. grain drills and planters, tillage 
tools, scales. combines. spreaders, sprayers, haying equipment. and any other machinery or 
equipment used primarily for agricultural purposes; but does not include vehicles required to be 
registered with the Motor Vehicle Division or vehicles or other equipment used for business 
purposes other than farming. 
(14) "Geothermal fluid" means water in any form at temperatures greater than 120 
degrees centigrade naturally present in a geothermal system. 
{15) "Geothermal resource" means: 
-4-
(a) the natural heat of the earth at temperatures greater than 120 degrees centigrade: and 
(b) the energy, in whatever form, including pressure, present in, resulting from, created 
by, or which may be extracted from that natural heat, directly or through a material medium. 
(16) (a) For purposes of Section 59-2-103: 
(i) "household" means the association of persons who live in the same dwelling sharing 
its furnishings facilities. accommodations. and expenses: and 
/ii) "household" includes married individuals who are not legally separated. that have 
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established domiciles at separate locations within the state. 
(bJ In accordance with Title 63 Chapter 46a Utah Administrative Rulemakinq Act the 
commission may make rules defining the term "domicile." 
[f46t] f.1I1 "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and 
improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been acquired to the land 
or not. 
[f4ft] 1.1fil "Intangible property" means: 






(v) representative property; 
(vi) franchises; 
(vii) licenses; 
(viii) trade names; 
(ix) copyrights; and 
(x) patents; or 
(b) a low-income housing tax credit. 
[f48t) fJ.fil "Low-income housing tax credit" means: 
- 5-
(a) a federal low-income housing tax credit under Section 42, Internal Revenue Code; or 
(b) a low-income housing tax credit under: 
(i) Section 59-7-607; or 
(ii) Section 59-10-129. 
[f49t] {2QJ_ "Metalliferous minerals" includes gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, and uranium. 
[~] f.2.11 "Mine" means a natural deposit of either metalliferous or nonmetalliferous 
valuable mineral. 
[~)@ "Mining" means the process of producing, extracting, leaching, evaporating, 
or otherwise removing a mineral from a mine. 
[~)@ (a) "Mobile flight equipment" means tangible personal property that is: 
(i) owned or operated by an: 
(A) air charter service: 
(B) air contract service; or 
(C) airline; and 
(ii) (A) capable of flight; 
(B) attached to an aircraft that is capable of flight; or 
(C) contained in an aircraft that is capable of flight if the tangible personal property is 
intended to be used: 
(I) during multiple flights; 
(II) during a takeoff, flight, or landing: and 
(Ill) as a service provided by an air charter service, air contract service, or airline. 
(b) (i) "Mobile flight equipment" does not include a spare part other than a spare engine 
that is rotated: 
(A) at regular intervals; and 
(B) with an engine that is attached to the aircraft. 
(ii) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the 
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commission may make rules defining the term "regular intervals." 
[~] ~ "Nonmetalliferous minerals" includes, but is not limited to. oil, gas, coal, salts, 
sand, rock, gravel, and all carboniferous materials. 
[~)@"Personal property" includes: 
(a) every class of property as defined in Subsection [~]@which is the subject of 
ownership and not included within the meaning of the terms "real estate" and "improvements"; 
(b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or alleys: 
(c) bridges and ferries; and 
(d) livestock which, for the purposes of the exemption provided under Section 
59-2-1112, means all domestic animals, honeybees, poultry, fur-bearing animals, and fish. 
[~] f.2§1 (a) "Property" means property that is subject to assessment and taxation 
according to its value. 
(b} "Property" does not include intangible property as defined in this section. 
[~]@ "Public utility," for purposes of this chapter, means the operating property of a 
railroad, gas corporation, oil or gas transportation or pipeline company, coal slurry pipeline 
company, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, sewerage corporation, or heat 
corporation where the company performs the service for, or delivers the commodity to, the public 
generally or companies serving the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation or an 
electrical corporation, where the gas or electricity is sold or furnished to any member or 
consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use. Public utility also means 
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the operating property of any entity or person defined under Section 54-2-1 except water 
corporations. 
[~]@ "Real estate" or "real property" includes: 
(a) the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the possession of land; 
(b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all timber belonging to 
individuals or corporations growing or being on the lands of this state or the United States, and all 
rights and privileges appertaining to these; and 
(c) improvements. 
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[~] L2fil "Residential property," for the purposes of the reductions and adjustments 
under this chapter, means any property used for residential purposes as a primary residence. It 
does not include property used for transient residential use or condominiums used in rental pools. 
[~] 00 For purposes of Subsection 59-2-801 (1)(e), "route miles" means the number 
of miles calculated by the commission that is: 
(a} measured in a straight line by the commission; and 
(b} equal to the distance between a geographical location that begins or ends: 
(i} at a boundary of the state; and 
(ii) where an aircraft: 
(A) takes off; or 
(B) lands. 
[taet) Q1J. (a) "State-assessed commercial vehicle" means: 
(i) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which operates interstate or intrastate to 
transport passengers, freight, merchandise, or other property for hire: or 
(ii) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which operates interstate and transports 
the vehicle owner's goods or property in furtherance of the owner's commercial enterprise. 
(b) "State-assessed commercial vehicle" does not include vehicles used for hire which are 
specified in Subsection (8)(c) as county-assessed commercial vehicles. 
[f34t] Q21. ''Taxable value" means fair market value less any applicable reduction allowed 
for residential property under Section 59-2-103. 
[~]~''Tax area" means a geographic area created by the overlapping boundaries of 
one or more taxing entities. 
[f337] {Ml ''Taxing entity" means any county, city, town. school district, special taxing 
district, or any other political subdivision of the state with the authority to levy a tax on property. 
[f3,4,) Qfil ''Tax roll" means a permanent record of the taxes charged on property, as 
extended on the assessment roll and may be maintained on the same record or records as the 
assessment roll or may be maintained on a separate record properly indexed to the assessment 
roll. It includes tax books, tax lists, and other similar materials. 
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Section 2. Section 59-2-103 is amended to read: 
59-2-103. Rate of assessment of property-- Residential property. 
(1) All tangible taxable property located within the state shall be assessed and taxed at a 
uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless 
otherwise provided by law. 
(2) [Be§iAAiA§] Subiectto Subsections (3) and (4) beginning on January 1. 1995. the fair 
market value of residential property located within the state shall be reduced by 45%, representing 
a residential exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2[-;--t:lffffl 
GeRstiMieA]. 
(3) No more than one acre of land per residential unit may qualify for the residential 
exemption. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b)(ii) beginning on January 1 2005 the 
residential exemption in Subsection (2) is limited to one primary residence per household. 
(b) An owner of multiple residential properties located within the state is allowed a 
residential exemption under Subsection /2/ for: 
Ii) subiect to Subsection (4)(aJ the primary residence of the owner and 
(ii) each residential property that is the primary residence of a tenant 
Section 3. Effective date. 
This bill takes effect on January 1 2005. 
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